Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker

Lossani, Marco Angelo; Natale, Piergiovanna; Tirelli, Patrizio

doi:10.1111/1467-9485.00080

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…All these contributions tend to lead to an argument for some weight conservatism, but the different types of stochastic inflation bias produce differing asymmetries between contracts and targets. In a different context, Lossani et al (1998) introduce uncertainty in the Lohmann (1992) variant of the Rogoff delegation scheme to show that appointing a conservative CB might involve major costs. All the various contributions listed above differ somewhat in their suggested solutions to the delegation problem, in line with the different sources of uncertainty.…”

Section: (D) a Comparison With The Current Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers

Muscatelli

1999

Economica

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This paper compares the relative effectiveness of inflation contracts and inflation targets in the presence of uncertainty regarding the central bank's preferences and the underlying output target. The model explains why discretion may be superior to a delegation solution. We also show that there might be the need to combine inflation targets and contracts with the appointment of a Rogoff-type 'conservative' central banker if contracts and targets cannot be made state-contingent, and that less flexible inflation targets may be appropriate with uncertain central bank preferences.

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Section: (D) a Comparison With The Current Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers

Muscatelli

1999

Economica

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“…In what follows timesubscripts are omitted for current-period variables. The governmentasociety is assumed to have a loss function which assigns a penalty to deviations of in¯ation from an optimal level (which for simplicity is assumed to be zero), 8 and to deviations of output from some output target y: 5 For other recent contributions which employ uncertain CB preferences, see Lossani et al (1997), Nolan and Schaling (1996), and Briault et al (1996). Beetsma and Jensen (1996) independently propose a very similar model to Muscatelli (1995).…”

Section: Optimal In¯ation Targets and Contracts With Uncertain Cb Prementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

Muscatelli

1998

The Economic Journal

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This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own in¯ation targets, i.e. by making it goalindependent.

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“…Finally, for the sake of completeness, we assume that the central bankers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of conservatism, which is common knowledge. 10 Notably, as we stressed above, the degree of conservatism -10 For more information on uncertainty and central banker's preferences, see Beetsma and Jensen (1998), Muscatelli (1998), Lossani et al (1998), Tillman (2008, Sorge (2013), andMorimoto (2018).…”

Section: Respectively and σ Lmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introducing Principles and Standards for Responsible Investment

Danilov

2023

WEIR

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The article provides information on the latest developments in the field of building sustainable finance standards as an integral element of the sustainable development model. The rapid growth of responsible investment naturally created a demand for the formation of principles and standards both for responsible investors themselves and for corporations wishing to attract responsible investments. The development of standards, norms and rules that ensure the effectiveness of responsible investments is carried out in close cooperation with international financial organizations, associations of market participants and regulators. The article presents a general picture of this process, including information about its main participants, their most important decisions and achievements in the field of implementing the concept of sustainable finance. It is divided into 4 blocks. The first block talks about the rules and regulations for responsible investment, including the requirements developed by such investors in relation to themselves. The second block briefly describes the process of standardizing the disclosure of non-financial information and the problems of ensuring its reliability. The standards for disclosure and confirmation of the reliability of information about the adherence of corporations to the principles of sustainable development create the basis for the formation of long-term trust, which is a prerequisite for the functioning of the sustainable development model. The third block briefly describes the styles of responsible investing and the trends in their application. The fourth block is devoted to proposals and projects for central banks to change their monetary policy in order to stimulate responsible investment. The article is aimed at the widest range of readers interested in the problems of responsible investment, focusing on the most important documents in this area developed abroad in recent years.

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Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker

Cited by 12 publications

References 22 publications

Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers

Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

Introducing Principles and Standards for Responsible Investment

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