Incorporating local institutions in irrigation experiments: evidence from rural communities in Pakistan

Abstract

ABSTRACT. Many irrigation systems are special cases of common-pool resources (CPRs) in which some users have preferential access to the resource, which in theory aggravates collective action challenges such as the under-provision of necessary infrastructure as a result of unequal appropriation of water resources. We present experimental evidence based on an irrigation game played in communities that are dependent on one of the largest contiguous irrigation network: the Indus basin irrigation system in Punjab, Pakistan. Furthermore, we simulate two institutional mechanisms that are neglected in experimental studies, despite their importance in many CPR governance systems: traditional authorities and legal pluralism. In our experiments, Punjabi farmers (N = 160) managed to provide the CPR at a level close to the social optimum, even without communication or enforcement opportunities. The equal investment in water infrastructure seems to be a strong social norm, even though those in disadvantageous positions (tail-users) earn less than those who have preferential access (head-users). At the same time, head-users restrain themselves from maximum resource extraction, which could be interpreted either as a norm or a stationary bandit strategy. In contrast to one of the most consistent findings of previous experimental studies, the participants in our experiment increased their earnings over the experimental rounds by using the available resources in a more efficient manner. One explanation for this behavior could be the availability of social information in our game. Starting from a high level of cooperation during baseline rounds, the treatments did not change the group investment significantly. The introduction of external sanctions created additional coordination problems, which led to a decrease in the level of group welfare. More specifically, head-users reduced their water extraction in the face of possible external sanctions to a level that the remaining water could not be used completely by tail-users.

Drivers of Farm Households’ Perceived Risk Sources and Factors Affecting Uptake of Mitigation Strategies in Punjab Pakistan: Implications for Sustainable Agriculture

“…In addition, new frameworks to achieve consistency in agricultural production at the local level and in regions with similar socioeconomic conditions can be chalked out. As discussed by Javaid and Flak [62], up-to-date information via effective institutional support would lead to increased input use efficiency (irrigation water use efficiency in particular) among small-scale family farms. On the other hand, risk mitigation through insurance, forward contracting, and spreading sales are shown to promote resilience of farm families that indirectly affects sustainable agriculture [63].…”

Experimental games for developing institutional capacity to manage common water infrastructure in India

“…Players in our game were relatively cooperative, which is common in irrigation experiments (Janssen et al, 2011;Javaid and Falk, 2015). They also showed the commonly observed downward trend in investments over the rounds (Fehr and Gächter, 2000;Chaudhuri, 2011) even though it was not significant when controlling for the lag of other players' contributions.…”

“…An analysis of the discussion content shows that the players mainly used this opportunity to coordinate. They certainly also received signals about other's willingness to cooperate (Javaid and Falk, 2015;Balliet, 2010). The later effect was strengthened through the disclosure of everybody's contributions.…”

Advancing the understanding of behavior in social-ecological systems: results from lab and field experiments

“…Consistent with Kreitmar (2015), public information about each user's extraction decisions led to higher levels of cooperation. Moreover, Javaid and Falk (2015) showed that external sanctions reduced the efficiency of group outcomes. Bell et al (2015) also performed irrigation experiments with farmers in Pakistan and included interactions between surface and groundwater supplies.…”

“…One way to address this question is to run experiments in the field with nonstudent populations as participants. Javaid and Falk (2015) conducted irrigation dilemma experiments in irrigation communities in Pakistan. Consistent with Kreitmar (2015), public information about each user's extraction decisions led to higher levels of cooperation.…”