Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies

Abstract

We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives over 10 legislatures elected using open-list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.

When does regression discontinuity design work? Evidence from random election outcomes

“…Third, we provide evidence that the local randomization approach advocated by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015) is also able to replicate the experimental estimate. Finally, our findings add to the cumulating evidence on limited personal incumbency advantage in proportional representation (PR) systems (see, e.g., Lundqvist (2013), Redmond and Regan (2015), Golden and Picci (2015), Dahlgaard (2016), and Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017)).…”

“…If the party effect is positive, the effects we find are likely to be lower than what has been reported in prior work. Moreover, the existing studies that look at a personal incumbency advantage in the PR systems of developed countries typically find only modest or no incumbency effects (Lundqvist (2013), Golden and Picci (2015), Dahlgaard (2016), and Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017)).…”

“…This corresponds to roughly 3% of the observations in the elections organized between 1996 and 2012. 21 Dahlgaard (2016), Golden and Picci (2015), Lundqvist (2013), and Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017) study quasi-randomization that takes place within parties in a PR system using an approach similar to ours.…”

Voters reward hard-working MPs: empirical evidence from the French legislative elections

“…Beyond the parliamentary instruments available at the individual level, our indicators capture the offices that the MPs hold within Parliament: such offices enjoy a good public visibility and are hypothesized to influence the incumbents' careers (Hermansen, 2018). Committee membership in particular plays a positive role in the reelection of MPs in many countries (Golden and Picci, 2015). French MPs judge that committee work is the most important tool at their disposal and they regard committee chairs as particularly influential (Vigour, 2013).…”

Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

“…3 van Coppenolle (2017, pp. 21-22) conjectures that one reason for the null effect in historical U.K. elections (1837 to 1910) may be the fact that dynasties were more prolific in the U.K. than the U.S., so perhaps crowded out opportunities for new dynasties to form.4 A few studies, such asGolden and Picci (2015) andKotakorpi, Poutvaara and Terviö (2017), investigate the phenomenon in (open) list systems with preferential voting. Using parties as the unit of analysis (rather than candidates), Liang (2013) identifies a party incumbency advantage under closed-list PR in Swedish local elections.…”