2005
DOI: 10.1002/smj.502
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Incumbent pricing responses to entry

Abstract: Empirical research on incumbent pricing responses to new entry has yielded mixed results. Some studies find that incumbents cut prices post entry, while others find that incumbents accommodate entry by leaving prices unchanged (or even raising prices). To better understand these findings, this study explores the conditions under which incumbents are more likely to cut prices when faced with entry. I argue that incumbents vary in their incentives to cut prices; incumbents with greater incentives are more likely… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

7
96
1

Year Published

2007
2007
2018
2018

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 93 publications
(104 citation statements)
references
References 40 publications
7
96
1
Order By: Relevance
“…We tested our hypotheses by estimating our model on subsets of the facilities about which we hypothesized, an approach used by many other organizational scholars (e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995;Zenger and Marshall, 2000;Simon, 2005;Xiao and Tsui, 2007) and in program evaluations of voluntary environmental programs and educational policies (e.g., Bali and Alvarez, 2003;Brouhle, Griffi ths, and Wolverton, 2009). To test H1, we estimated our model on the subsample of facilities (and their matched controls) that disclosed a violation to the Audit Policy without a direct regulatory threat, defi ned as those facilities that were not targeted by a U.S. EPA Compliance Incentive Program in the disclosure (or match) year.…”
Section: Model Specifi Cationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We tested our hypotheses by estimating our model on subsets of the facilities about which we hypothesized, an approach used by many other organizational scholars (e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995;Zenger and Marshall, 2000;Simon, 2005;Xiao and Tsui, 2007) and in program evaluations of voluntary environmental programs and educational policies (e.g., Bali and Alvarez, 2003;Brouhle, Griffi ths, and Wolverton, 2009). To test H1, we estimated our model on the subsample of facilities (and their matched controls) that disclosed a violation to the Audit Policy without a direct regulatory threat, defi ned as those facilities that were not targeted by a U.S. EPA Compliance Incentive Program in the disclosure (or match) year.…”
Section: Model Specifi Cationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While most empirical studies examining incumbent responses to entry focus on tactical changes such as adjusting prices, quality levels or production capacity (e.g., Lieberman 1987;Yamawaki 2002;Frank and Salkever 2004;Simon 2005;Seamans 2009), our theoretical analysis generates several predications related to firms' strategic decisions. Reduced-form regressions are more amenable than structural estimation to testing these predications for a couple of reasons.…”
Section: Empirical Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Essential endogenous barriers may begin from excess capacity. This is usually accompanied by greater than before advertising or promotional programme (Gable et al, 1995) or pre-emptive pricing strategy that will result in price wars as a primary form of competition (Simon, 2005). It is thus apt to view endogenous barriers as existing firms' reactions to new market entrants (Karakaya & Stahl, 1989).…”
Section: Barriers To Market Entry and Its Impact On The Entry Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%