2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102579
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Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)

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Cited by 11 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…First, if a central bank is independent of CEOs' appointments or dismissals and policy‐making, the whole country may face the moral hazard of the promises made by the central bank. Central bankers are still humans who can be irrational in policy‐making (Masciandaro, 2022). An independent central bank may promise inflation targeting or a relatively stable monetary policy and financial market interventions.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, if a central bank is independent of CEOs' appointments or dismissals and policy‐making, the whole country may face the moral hazard of the promises made by the central bank. Central bankers are still humans who can be irrational in policy‐making (Masciandaro, 2022). An independent central bank may promise inflation targeting or a relatively stable monetary policy and financial market interventions.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%