Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions

Dreher, Axel; Jensen, Nathan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.459280

Cited by 119 publications

(155 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…This is also the position of the Fund (Nowzad 1981;Khan and Knight 1983). 4 It has been alleged that politically weak countries have to accept stronger conditionality than more influential ones (see, e.g., Goldstein 2000;Dreher 2004a;Dreher and Jensen 2007;). It also has been said that conditionality has not taken the specific political situation in the borrowing countries into account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

2009

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This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Major shareholders of the Fund enforce conditions which they would have difficulties to demand on a bilateral basis (James 1998;Mussa and Savastano 1999;Dreher and Jensen 2007;). It has been asserted that the US government drives the IMF's policies (Frey 1997, p. 121;Goldstein 2000, p. 67;McKeown 2009).…”

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IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

2009

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“…The results also show that the impact of a movement towards the U.S. on the probability of obtaining IMF programs does not depend on the initial position. Other scholars have found that UN General Assembly voting is a significant predictor of IMF support (Oatley and Yackee 2004;Stone 2004;Barro and Lee 2005;Dreher and Jensen 2007) and World Bank funds (Andersen, Hansen and Markussen 2006).…”

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confidence: 98%

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Dreher

Jensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this project we explore the relationship between leader change and relations between states. Voting in the United Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) is often used as a measure of political proximity between countries. We use UN voting coincidence to examine how changes in leadership affect relations. Specifically, we examine how political change affects a country's voting with the United States. In this paper we explore how leadership change affects UNGA voting. Using differences between "key" and "non-key" UN votes to the United States, we explore if political change is driven by preference change or by a changing external position. While political change has little impact on voting on non-key issues (state preferences) we find that after leadership change, countries are more likely to vote in line with the United States on key UN votes. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…Beginning about the same time, a surge of quantitative empirical work arose that focused on particular international organizations. A flood of research emerged on the politics of the IMF (Stone 2002(Stone , 2004(Stone , 2008Vreeland 2003;Gould 2006;Dreher and Vaubel 2004;Dreher and Jensen 2007;Chwieroth 2010;Pop-Eleches 2009;Copelovitch 2010;Steinwand and Stone 2008) and the world bank (Dreher et al 2009;Fleck and Kilby 2006). Meanwhile, an even larger literature was growing that studied all aspects of policy making in the European Union with an increasing degree of empirical and theoretical sophistication Schneider 2009;Thompson et al 2006).…”

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Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

Stone

2013

Rev Int Organ

130

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International organizations have proliferated in recent decades. Virtually every issue of broad international concern is the subject of an international agreement that is administered by an international organization. Broad powers are delegated to some of these international agents, many of which exercise significant discretion and authority. International courts with broad jurisdiction and hundreds of more specialized judicial organs have been established to interpret a rapidly expanding body of international law. The organizational capacity of international governance has increased, while the capacity of domestic governance has declined in a range of failed states and contested territories. Meanwhile, the depth of policy coordination demanded by international agreements has led to an unprecedented level of international policy activism by some of the leading international organizations, including the IMF, the WTO, and the EU. Given the importance of what international organizations do, it is increasingly important to understand how international organizations actually work.Most of our theoretical models of international organizations are based on their formal attributes rather than on their behavior. Formal rules are important, of course, and generally set the parameters within which informal interactions take place, but shared expectations and extra-legal practices often modify or overrule written provisions. As a result, models based on legal provisions can be misleading. For example, there are numerous international organizations in which votes are never taken, or are almost always unanimous; nevertheless, analyses of their governance often focus on the equilibria of majority voting games. Since the game being played does not involve building minimum winning coalitions, however, voting models based on majority voting can shed little light on the degree of influence that powerful countries exert over decision making, or on the practical limits of that influence. Similarly, procedural models of EU legislation assume that the game being played follows the legal procedures prescribed in the EU treaties; but this is often not the Rev Int

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Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions

Cited by 119 publications

References 15 publications

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

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