Independent Coding of Reward Magnitude and Valence in the Human Brain

Abstract

Previous research has shown that two components of the event-related brain potential, the P300 and feedback negativity, are sensitive to information about rewards and penalties. The present study investigated the properties of these components in a simple gambling game that required participants to choose between cards that were unpredictably associated with monetary gains and losses of variable magnitude. The aim was to determine the sensitivity of each component to two critical features of reward stimuli: magnitude (small or large) and valence (win or loss). A double dissociation was observed, with the P300 sensitive to reward magnitude but insensitive to reward valence and the feedback negativity showing the opposite pattern, suggesting that these two fundamental features of rewarding stimuli are evaluated rapidly and separately in the human brain. Subsequent analyses provided additional evidence of functional dissociations between the feedback negativity and P300. First, the P300 (but not the feedback negativity) showed sensitivity to the reward value of alternative, nonselected stimuli. Second, individual differences in the amplitude of the feedback negativity correlated with individual differences in risk-taking behavior observed after monetary losses, whereas individual differences in P300 amplitude were related to behavioral adjustments observed in response to alternative, unchosen outcomes.

Activity in human reward-sensitive brain areas is strongly context dependent

“…To explain this finding, one might propose that reward processing, at least of abstract financial reinforcers, is rather coarse in nature, providing a discrete evaluation of events as good or bad regardless of magnitude. Similar results have been reported for the feedback negativity (Holroyd et al, 2004a;Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). In contrast, the results seem inconsistent with a recent study that found a parametric ordering (in terms of both timing and magnitude) of the BOLD responses in left caudate nucleus to the magnitude of monetary gains and losses (Delgado et al, 2003).…”

Valence and magnitude ambiguity in feedback processing

“…Presumably, this is because of a general preference for certain information over uncertain information, which results in the “ambiguity aversion” phenomenon on the behavioral level (Ho et al., 2002; Payzan‐LeNestour & Bossaerts, 2011). In addition, it is worth noting that the FRN is sensitive to the relevance of an ongoing event to behavioral adjustments (Holroyd, Baker, Kerns, & Muller, 2008; Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2010; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). From this perspective, the larger FRN following ambiguous magnitude may indicate a stronger motivation to seek unambiguous information, in order to reduce the uncertainty of the current scenario.…”

“…Specifically, the authors aim to investigate how ambiguity in outcome feedback is reflected in brain activity. Two major dimensions that characterize outcome feedback are valence and magnitude (Litt, Plassmann, Shiv, & Rangel, 2011; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). The valence dimension indicates whether a stimulus is desirable, which is positive for rewards and negative for punishments (Litt et al., 2011; Paton, Belova, Morrison, & Salzman, 2006).…”

“…In most previous studies using outcome feedback with both valence and magnitude, the two pieces of information are presented at the same time (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Berns and Bell (2012) has pointed out that when different dimensions of information are presented simultaneously, it is impossible to know how individuals allocate their attention to each dimension.…”

“…Holroyd and Coles (2002) first proposed that the FRN represents a reward prediction error “corresponding to the difference between the amount of reward obtained and the prior expected value of the reward,” indicating that the FRN amplitude should encode both valence and magnitude (see also Hajihosseini & Holroyd, 2013; Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004). Since then, the cognitive function of the FRN has been debated for more than a decade, as many researchers suggest that this component reflects a binary rather than continuous evaluation of events along a good‐no good dimension, such that unfavorable feedback elicits a larger FRN than favorable feedback (e.g., Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). However, accumulating evidences from recent studies are in favor of Holroyd and Coles's (2002) original idea (e.g., Goyer et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2011; Meadows, Gable, Lohse, & Miller, 2016; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015).…”