Independent Parties in Minimizing Agency Problem in Indonesia: An Alternative Model

Rinaldo, Dito; Puspita, Vina Anggilia

doi:10.2478/hjbpa-2020-0002

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The source of data is the CSMAR database. This task is traditionally performed as per the Global Reporting Initiative's (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines [65,73,83]. The contextual regulations' differences affect the process as they vary among republics [84,85].…”

Section: Measuring the Quality Of Csr Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

CSR Disclosure: Effects of Political Ties, Executive Turnover and Shareholder Equity. Evidence from China

et al. 2021

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The context of China fosters different contextual factors, which influences the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in comparison to firms across the rest of the world. Political ties at a corporate level are one of these vital factors. This paper studies the influence of firm-level political ties (PT) and executive turnover (ET) on the quality of CSR disclosure in the context of shareholding status of departing executive in Chinese listed A-share firms. Stakeholder and Agency theories are applied to the dissemination of CSR disclosures in Chinese firms whereby we used 20,578 firm-years interpretations of Chinese registered companies between 2012 and 2019. The results foster a negative link between executive turnover and quality of CSR disclosures. In addition, a negative relationship has been found between political ties and the quality of CSR disclosure. The findings disclose that the shareholding status of departing executive moderate the relationship between the impact of political ties and executive turnover on firms quality of CSR disclosure, whilst the effect of executive turnover on the quality of CSR disclosure was found more pronounced for firms whose departing executive held larger shareholding (SH). This study contributed to the literature on the quality of CSR disclosure while recognizing the negative effect of executive turnover on a firm’s quality of CSR disclosure for politically tied firms with a reinforcing moderating role of the shareholding status of departing executive.

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Section: Measuring the Quality Of Csr Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

CSR Disclosure: Effects of Political Ties, Executive Turnover and Shareholder Equity. Evidence from China

et al. 2021

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“…Agency conflict has been documented in a broad range of academic subjects. For instance, accounting (Al-Saidi, 2020; Ronen, Kashi, & Balachandran, 1995), finance (Fama & Jensen, 1983;Rinaldo & Puspita, 2020), economics (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;Kusumadewi & Wardhani, 2020), political science (Brando de Oliveira, Getulio Vargas, & Brasileira de, 2017; Hammond & Knott, 1996), sociology (Tate, Ellram, Bals, Hartmann, & van der Valk, 2010;Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). In general, agency conflict arises when managers' goals vary from those of the shareholders, such as maximising their wealth, avoiding risk, or being opportunistic.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the role of institutional investors in voting, monitoring and dialogue engagement in mitigating agency conflict in Malaysia’s public listed companies

Maznorbalia

Awalluddin

Ayob

2023

Humanit Soc Sci Commun

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Institutional investors are very important for keeping shareholder value high by reducing agency conflict and promoting good governance. Recent governance scandals have placed Malaysia on the global stage, jeopardising the publicly listed companies (PLCs) reputation and calling into question the effectiveness of the country’s corporate governance mechanism. The study aimed to examine the level of agency conflict in Malaysian PLCs and the roles of institutional investors in mitigating agency issues. At the same time, we are exploring unclear institutional investors level of activism in Malaysia and evaluating which roles are considered powerful among institutional investors. The findings demonstrated that institutional investors significantly mitigate agency conflict, with monitoring and dialogue engagement as the most influential roles. Conclusively, the discovery reinstated Type 1 agency conflict (principal-agent) among important issues for corporate governance in Malaysia. The study meets the gaps of prior research in the Malaysian context of agency conflict. It offers a novelty on agency conflict examination in Malaysia as well as exploring institutional investors’ roles and recommending an approach that can be taken to strengthen the governance mechanism among PLCs in Malaysia. The present study advises institutional investors to play aggressive roles in managing agency issues, and relevant bodies need to enhance awareness of agency issues.

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Independent Parties in Minimizing Agency Problem in Indonesia: An Alternative Model

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

CSR Disclosure: Effects of Political Ties, Executive Turnover and Shareholder Equity. Evidence from China

CSR Disclosure: Effects of Political Ties, Executive Turnover and Shareholder Equity. Evidence from China

Exploring the role of institutional investors in voting, monitoring and dialogue engagement in mitigating agency conflict in Malaysia’s public listed companies

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