Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions

Balaguer, Mark

doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6217-3

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…Cf. Balaguer 2005.). 7 Frege's objections to psychologism may be found in Frege1884/1953Frege1884/ (pp.…”

Section: Type-psychologismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentional psychologism

Pitt

2008

Philos Stud

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In the past few years, a number of philosophers (notably, Siewert, C. (The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Horgan and Tienson (Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 520-533); Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: (1) there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; (2) different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and (3) thoughts with the same phenomenology have the same intentional content. The last of these three claims is open to at least two different interpretations. It might mean that the phenomenology of a thought expresses its intentional content, where intentional content is understood as propositional, and propositions are understood as mind-and languageindependent abstract entities (such as sets of possible worlds, functions from possible worlds to truth-values, structured n-tuples of objects and properties, etc.). And it might mean that the phenomenology of a thought is its intentional content-that is, that the phenomenology of a thought, like the phenomenology of a sensation, constitutes its content. The second sort of view is a kind of psychologism. Psychologistic views hold that one or another sort of thing-numbers, sentences, propositions, etc.-that we can think or know about is in fact a kind of mental thing. Since Frege, psychologism has been in bad repute among analytic philosophers. It is widely held that Frege showed that such views are untenable, since, among other things, they subjectivize what is in fact objective, and, hence, relativize such things as consistency and truth to the peculiarities of human psychology. The purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the thesis that intentional mental content is phenomenological (what I call ''intentional psychologism'') and to try to reach a

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“…Cf. Balaguer 2005.). 7 Frege's objections to psychologism may be found in Frege1884/1953Frege1884/ (pp.…”

Section: Type-psychologismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentional psychologism

Pitt

2008

Philos Stud

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“…The reason no non-indexical specification of the propositional relata of the belief relation is forthcoming is, on this view, because any such specification involves singling out a specific set of truth conditions. 19 Balaguer (2005). 20 Pruim (1996).…”

Section: The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The inessential quasi-indexical

Alward

2008

Philos Stud

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In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the ''problem of the essential indexical'' reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.Keywords Belief Á Indexical Á Perry Á Locating belief As Perry originally formulated things, the primary casualty of the problem of the essential indexical was the analysis of belief as a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition. 1 Strictly speaking, of course, Perry argued that the problem he identified undermined the ''doctrine of propositions'' which consists of this analysis of belief together with the claims that the truth-values of propositions are independent of contextual parameters (other than worlds) and that propositions are individuated more finely than truth-conditions. 2 But he went on to assert that the only adequate solution to the problem involved the rejection of the ''propositional-P. Alward (&)

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Descriptive Indexicals, Propositional Attitudes and the Double Role of Context

Kijania-Placek

2015

Modeling and Using Context

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Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions

Cited by 4 publications

References 23 publications

Intentional psychologism

Intentional psychologism

The inessential quasi-indexical

Descriptive Indexicals, Propositional Attitudes and the Double Role of Context

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