The addition of Gulf states to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has significantly altered regional dynamics. By examining two Gulf states’ foreign policy motivations for joining the SCO, through the lens of institutional balancing and hedging concepts, we argue that they engage in both hedging through multi-alignment to achieve national objectives and mitigate risks and institutional balancing in order to constrain China’s and Russia’s geopolitical ambitions within the organisation, check their regional rivals and at the same time exclude the United States from an emerging security architecture. Moreover, Gulf states’ priorities focus on strategic autonomy and have avoided taking clear-cut sides in the US–China competition, while not isolating Russia despite capitalising on its deteriorating position in the Middle East since the Ukraine war. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s reluctant position as a unitary actor in establishing relations with the SCO indicates its strategic neutrality and a cautious stance towards the United States as its security guarantor.