Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem

Abstract

Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises.

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

“…One concerns the evolution of human communities: how does cooperation work in villages and small-scale societies? (See Dufwenberg et al (2001), Masuda and Ohtsuki (2007), Milinski et al (2002a, b), Panchanathan and Boyd (2004), Roberts (2008), Semmann et al (2004) and Suzuki and Akiyama (2007a, b)). Recently, evidence for indirect reciprocation in other species has also been uncovered (Bshary and Grutter, 2006).…”

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

“…A particularly interesting system of incentives is considered in [73] and [74]. Between rounds of the Public Good game without Punishment, the population engages in pair-wise interactions of indirect reciprocity (Box 1).…”

Cognitive adaptations for n‐person exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior

“…The punishment of free riders is viewed as a collective action problem (Yamagishi, 1986), and the evolution of punishment is considered to suffer from a second-order free rider problem. Therefore, according to this line of thinking, motivational mechanisms designed to punish free riders cannot evolve without group selection or gene-culture coevolutionary dynamics (Boyd and Richerson 1992;Boyd et al, 2003;Henrich, 2004; see also Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004).…”