Individual Contributions for Collective Goods

Abstract

There is a growing controversy as to what behavior is to be expected of individuals regarding contributions for the supply of collective goods. This paper attempts to settle some of the controversy. It attempts to do so not by showing that one of the positions taken is correct and the others wrong, but by showing that the various authors in question reach different conclusions about individual behavior in situations involving the potential supply of collective goods because they make different assumptions regarding the nature of the goods and the nature of the situations in which the individuals find themselves. The different conclusions are reconciled by a careful examination of the assumptions of the authors. Specific variables are identified which account for the differences in the models and a set of dimensions along which collective goods situations can vary is presented.

The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions

“…Such cases have been discussed in Olson (1971), in Frohlich, Hunt, Oppenheimer and Wagner (1975) and in Brookshire, Coursey and Redington (1989). This situation is examined by providing a level of benefit from the public good that any subject would prefer to zero investment in the group exchange.…”

Use of collective action for land accessibility among settled Fulani agro-pastoralists in southwest Nigeria

“…According to Oliver (1980), a number of critique and reformulations of The Logic of Collective Action have appeared in the literature. In summary, the articles agree that the rationality of collective action varies from situation to situation and depends upon the specific functions describing the cost of the good, its value to the individual, the probability that the good will be provided without his/ her contribution and the effect (if any) of group size on the other functions (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970;Chamberlin 1974;Frohlich et al 1975;Schofield 1975;Bonacich et al 1976;Smith 1976). Therefore, the fact that the rationality of collective action depends upon specific parameters of a situation is precisely why selective incentives are so important for collective action.…”

Public goods and fairness

“…But there are other versions as well. For a helpful discussion of the variety of strategic situations surrounding the production of public goods, see Hampton [1987]; also Frohlich et al [1975].…”