Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation

Karni, Edi; Safra, Zvi

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00275

Cited by 80 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…1 This note studies only such outcome-based or "consequentialist" theories, as opposed to those that allow payoffs to depend directly on the beliefs and intentions of others, as in Rabin [1993]. 2 For example Karni and Safra [2002] make use of only a partial version of independence in their study of the use of lotteries to solve indivisibility problems. Grant et al [2010] also recognize this when they reconcile the Diamond paradox with Harsanyi's social choice theory: they do so by means of a social To formalize the insight in the various past examples and experiments, we give formal and fairly weak definitions of fairness, using only the domain of "coin flip" lotteries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems

Fudenberg

Levine

2012

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Abstract:The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems

Fudenberg

Levine

2012

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…The second approach seems normatively more convincing because it retains expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and derives fairness from individual preferences (Karni 1996;Karni and Safra 2002). In particular, the individual fairness preferences may differ across agents.…”

Section: Non-utilitarian Social Welfare Versus All-inclusive Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility

Trautmann

2008

Theory Decis

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Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi's utilitarianism through all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarianism unfalsifiable, however, if agents' all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified. This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness preferences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation examples.

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“…For example, suppose individuals are either Benthamite 6 See Karni and Safra (2002) for an axiomatic justification of separable preferences for individuals with both private interests and a preference for fairness.…”

Section: A Deliberative Committeementioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberation and Voting Rules

Austen‐Smith

Feddersen

2005

Social Choice and Strategic Decisions

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We analyse a formal model of decision-making by a deliberative committee. There is a given binary agenda. Individuals evaluate the two alternatives on both private and common interest grounds. Each individual has two sorts of private information going into committee: (a) perfect information about their personal bias and (b) noisy information about which alternative is best with respect to a (commonly held) normative criterion. Prior to a committee vote to choose an alternative, committee members engage in deliberation, modeled as a simultaneous cheap-talk game. We explore and compare equilibrium properties under majority and unanimity voting rules, paying particular attention to the character of debate (who influences who and how) and quality of the decision in each instance. On balance, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors than unanimity. Furthermore, the influence and character of deliberation per se can vary more under majority rule than under unanimity.

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Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation

Cited by 80 publications

References 15 publications

Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems

Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems

Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility

Deliberation and Voting Rules

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