Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax

Römer, Thomas

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(75)90016-x

Cited by 678 publications

(438 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…3 The special case of this framework was first studied by Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977). The static framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is extended to a dynamic setting in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), relating redistribution to economic growth.…”

Section: A Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from the UK

Pogorelskiy

Traub

2017

SSRN Journal

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We introduce a skewness-based approach to measure tax progression and demand for redistribution. Adapting a novel, quantilebased statistical measure of skewness to right-skewed income distributions, we uncover its political economy foundation, by simultaneously relating the same measure to the classical model of income redistribution due to Meltzer and Richard (1981), to the Prospect Of Upward Mobility (POUM) mechanism due to Bènabou and Ok (2001), and to the progressivity of a tax schedule. In an empirical analysis of UK income distributions in 1979 -2013, we find that skewness has increased over time, with the rich moving further away from the median. While the magnitude of the increase has remained small enough so that observed redistribution (or lack thereof ) could be consistent with POUM hypothesis, more recent periods show an increase in tax progression. JEL: D31, D63, H20, P16

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Section: A Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from the UK

Pogorelskiy

Traub

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…They also show that under additional, rather strong conditions, such a tax function is progressive. Roemer (1994) provides some simulated equilibria in a model with constituency-representing parties and uncertainty. But the admissible tax functions are also quadratic in income.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Cukierman and Meltzer (1991), Snyder and Kramer (1988), Roemer (1994), and Gans and Smart (1996) different tax functions are considered but some new, also quite restrictive, assumptions are needed. In Snyder and Kramer (1988) only tax functions which are individually optimal for some voter are allowed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

Marhuenda

Ortuño‐Ortín

1998

Journal of Public Economics

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This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels. © 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

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“…Ökonomische Erklärungsansätze gehen im Grunde auf das Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard Modell (RRMR) (Romer (1975); Roberts (1977); Meltzer und Richard (1981) …”

Section: Nachfrage Nach Staatlicher Umverteilungunclassified

Discrete-Choice-Experimente zur Ermittlung der Präferenzen für Umverteilung

Pfarr

Ulrich

2011

Review of Economics

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SummaryAs in most industrialized countries, the inequality regarding the distribution of household incomes in Germany has steadily increased. By collecting taxes and granting monetary transfers, the government tries to affect the personal distribution of incomes. Whereas the supply of redistribution is relatively easy to determine, it is rather difficult to identify the determinants of the citizens′ demand for redistribution. Most of the literature concerning the individuals′ preferences for redistribution relies on survey based analysis. A shortcoming of these studies is the failure of imposing a budget constraint. Discrete-Choice-Experiments (DCE) solve this problem by forcing individuals to take the consequences of their decisions with respect to their own income into account. This study aims at developing a theory based approach to elicit individuals′ preferences for redistribution using DCEs. For the specific case of Germany, we show how to design and implement such a DCE. In particular, we discuss how the price attribute in a DCE should be specified and which levels adequately define the price an individual is willing to pay for redistribution. We are able to demonstrate that even for a highly complex topic such as redistribution a correctly applied DCE can provide authoritative results. This allows deriving policy implications on how to design redistributive policies which are in line with citizens’ preferences.

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Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax

Cited by 678 publications

References 2 publications

Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from the UK

Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from the UK

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

Discrete-Choice-Experimente zur Ermittlung der Präferenzen für Umverteilung

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