Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality

Abstract

This paper argues that first-person singular I-and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I-You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I-and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentionality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations obtain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional 'I' independently of entering the I-You, and when they do so they are an intentional 'we.'