Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species concept

Mishler, Brent D.; Brandon, Robert N.

doi:10.1007/bf00127698

Cited by 364 publications

(168 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…However, with SNaRCs we restrict the naming of terminal taxa to entities regarded as clades, by requiring the author of a SNaRC name to present evidence of monophyly. The LITUs of Pleijel and Rouse (2000) are less restrictive "groups which at present are not further subdivided," leaving open the option to name "metaphyletic" groups (to use the terminology of Mishler and Brandon 1987), or potentially even paraphyletic groups. LITUs are thus purely nomenclatural entities.…”

Section: Capturing the Snarcmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hunting of the SNaRC: A Snarky Solution to the Species Problem

Mishler¹,

Wilkins²

2018

Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology

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We argue that the logical outcome of the cladistics revolution in biological systematics, and the move towards rankless phylogenetic classification of nested monophyletic groups as formalized in the PhyloCode, is to eliminate the species rank along with all the others and simply name clades. We propose that the lowest level of formally named clade be the SNaRC, the Smallest Named and Registered Clade. The SNaRC is an epistemic level in the classification, not an ontic one. Naming stops at that level because there is no currently acceptable evidence for clades within it, not because no smaller clades exist. Later, included clades may be named. They would then become the SNaRCs, while the original SNaRC would keep its original name. We argue that all theoretical tasks of biology, in evolution and ecology, as well as practical tasks such as conservation assessment, are better approached using this rankless phylogenetic approach.

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Section: Capturing the Snarcmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hunting of the SNaRC: A Snarky Solution to the Species Problem

Mishler¹,

Wilkins²

2018

Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology

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“…But as Baum points out, under almost any definition of species, we will need to be able to delimit a time-limited species in order to construct a timeextended species out of it, so there is nothing particularly surprising or undesirable about being forced into a time-limited approach. It is likely that Mishler and Brandon (1987) anticipated this issue without making the distinction between monophyletic and exclusive groups which is why they defined monophyly in a synchronic (or time-limited) way.…”

Section: From Monophyly To Exclusivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mishler & Donoghue (1982), Donoghue (1985), Mishler (1985), Mishler & Brandon (1987), and Mishler and Theriot (2000), each present versions of a PSC that allows only monophyletic groups to be species. These versions can often lead to different groupings than the "diagnostic" version of the PSC.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…These versions can often lead to different groupings than the "diagnostic" version of the PSC. For example, Mishler and Theriot (2000: 46, 47), takes its cue from Mishler and Brandon (1987) and says, A species is the least inclusive taxon recognized in a formal phylogenetic classification. As with all hierarchical levels of taxa in such a classification, organisms are grouped into species because of evidence of monophyly.…”

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When monophyly is not enough: exclusivity as the key to defining a phylogenetic species concept

Velasco

2009

Biol Philos

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When monophyly is not enough:Exclusivity as the key to defining a phylogenetic species concept abstract: A natural starting place for developing a phylogenetic species concept is to examine monophyletic groups of organisms. Proponents of "the" Phylogenetic Species Concept fall into one of two camps. The first camp denies that species even could be monophyletic and groups organisms using character traits. The second groups organisms using common ancestry and requires that species must be monophyletic. I argue that neither view is entirely correct. While monophyletic groups of organisms exist, they should not be equated with species.Instead, species must meet the more restrictive criterion of being genealogically exclusive groups where the members are more closely related to each other than to anything outside the group. I carefully spell out different versions of what this might mean and arrive at a working definition of exclusivity that forms groups that can function within phylogenetic theory. I conclude by arguing that while a phylogenetic species concept must use exclusivity as a grouping criterion, a variety of ranking criteria are consistent with the requirement that species can be placed on phylogenetic trees. 2 IntroductionThe species problem -how to sort organisms into various speciesremains a central problem in biological taxonomy. Despite many bitter disagreements about these fundamental units, there is widespread agreement on how to delimit "higher" taxa (those that are more inclusive than species). Many authors have argued that while phylogenetics is an important biological project, other projects are important as well and can lead to different,

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“…Giray (20) produced one of the early criticisms of morphological species concepts and proposed a synthesis of different variants of the biological species concept that had been put forth by biologists up to that point. Mishler and Brandon (21) compared the biological and phylogenetic concepts in terms of the idea that species are individuals (which is fundamental to theories such as species selection, Refs. 22,23).…”

Section: Eg Nixon and Wheeler 1990; Mckitrick And Zink 1988 Populamentioning

confidence: 99%

Species as family resemblance concepts: The (dis‐)solution of the species problem?

Pigliucci

2003

BioEssays

138

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SummaryThe so-called ''species problem'' has plagued evolutionary biology since before Darwin's publication of the aptly titled Origin of Species. Many biologists think the problem is just a matter of semantics; others complain that it will not be solved until we have more empirical data. Yet, we don't seem to be able to escape discussing it and teaching seminars about it. In this paper, I briefly examine the main themes of the biological and philosophical literatures on the species problem, focusing on identifying common threads as well as relevant differences. I then argue two fundamental points. First, the species problem is not primarily an empirical one, but it is rather fraught with philosophical questions that require-but cannot be settled by-empirical evidence. Second, the (dis-)solution lies in explicitly adopting Wittgenstein's idea of ''family resemblance'' or cluster concepts, and to consider species as an example of such concepts. This solution has several attractive features, including bringing together apparently diverging themes of discussion among biologists and philosophers. The current proposal is conceptually independent (though not incompatible) with the pluralist approach to the species problem advocated by Mishler, Donoghue, Kitcher and Dupré , which implies that distinct aspects of the species question need to be emphasized depending on the goals of the researcher. From the biological literature, the concept of species that most closely matches the philosophical discussion presented here is Templeton's cohesion idea.

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Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species concept

Cited by 364 publications

References 37 publications

The Hunting of the SNaRC: A Snarky Solution to the Species Problem

The Hunting of the SNaRC: A Snarky Solution to the Species Problem

When monophyly is not enough: exclusivity as the key to defining a phylogenetic species concept

Species as family resemblance concepts: The (dis‐)solution of the species problem?

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