2020
DOI: 10.1111/rati.12296
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Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?

Abstract: Many find it an attractive idea that if one knows that p, one's belief that p must be safe-that is, the belief could not easily have been false (e.g., Pritchard, 2012;Sosa, 1999;Williamson, 2000). In terms of possible world semantics, a safe belief is true in the actual world, as well as in relevantly close possible worlds. Now, depending on the scope of 'close possible worlds', safety typically comes in the following varieties:

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Cited by 4 publications
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“… 17 Zhao (2020 b ), Zhao and Baumann (Forthcoming) argue that an account like SAA also addresses some other objections to safety.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 17 Zhao (2020 b ), Zhao and Baumann (Forthcoming) argue that an account like SAA also addresses some other objections to safety.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%