Industrial Deployment of System Engineering Methods

Romanovsky, Alexander; Thomas, Martyn

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33170-1

Cited by 32 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Consider an abstract event e and the corresponding concrete event f. Somewhat simplifying, we say that e is refined by f if f's guard is stronger than that of e and f's action can be simulated by e's action, taking into account the gluing invariant J. More information about Event-B can be found in (Hoang, 2013). Event-B is supported by Rodin (Abrial et al, 2010), an extensible toolkit which includes facilities for modelling, verifying the consistency of models using theorem proving and model checking techniques, and validating models with simulation-based approaches.…”

Section: Event-bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Framework for Trustworthy Autonomous Maritime Systems

Dghaym¹,

Turnock²,

Butler³

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the International Seminar on Safety and Security of Autonomous Vessels (ISSAV) and European STAMP Workshop and C

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A key risk with autonomous systems (AS) is the trustworthiness of the decision-making and control mechanisms that replace human control. To be trustworthy, systems need to remain safe while being resilient to unpredictable changes, functional/operational failures and cybersecurity threats. Rigorous validation (does the solution satisfy the stakeholders' requirements and system's needs?) and verification (is the system free from errors?) are essential to ensure trustworthiness of AS. Current engineering practice relies heavily on Verification and Validation (V&V) test-and-fix of system characteristics which is very time-consuming and expensive, limiting the possibilities for exploration of alternatives in system design. We present an approach to identifying and analysing mission requirements for squads of autonomous missions. Clear definition of requirements is an important prerequisite for mission planning and for V&V of mission management. We use a structured approach to requirements identification and use formal modelling to help remove ambiguities in the requirements and to specify formal properties that should be satisfied by the missions. Our approach is being evaluated through consideration of a combined mission of the commercial C-Cat3 Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) (ASV Global, 2019) with deployment /recovery of small Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) within a shipping channel whereby the USV has to safely maintain station for a long period and then proceed to recover the UUV, while maintaining a communication link to an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

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Section: Event-bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Framework for Trustworthy Autonomous Maritime Systems

Dghaym¹,

Turnock²,

Butler³

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the International Seminar on Safety and Security of Autonomous Vessels (ISSAV) and European STAMP Workshop and C

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show abstract

“…We can gradually introduce and verify concepts and constraints in a system while moving from abstract, prescriptive representations to concrete, realizable ones. The effectiveness of refining the mitigating complexity has been demonstrated, for example, in industrial experiences with Event-B [2], [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Change Impact Analysis for Refinement-Based Formal Specification

Saruwatari

Ishikawa

Kobayashi

et al. 2019

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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Refinement-based formal specification is a promising approach to the increasing complexity of software systems, as demonstrated in the formal method Event-B. It allows stepwise modeling and verifying of complex systems with multiple steps at different abstraction levels. However, making changes is more difficult, as caution is necessary to avoid breaking the consistency between the steps. Judging whether a change is valid or not is a non-trivial task, as the logical dependency relationships between the modeling elements (predicates) are implicit and complex. In this paper, we propose a method for analyzing the impact of the changes of Event-B. By attaching labels to modeling elements (predicates), the method helps engineers understand how a model is structured and what needs to be modified to accomplish a change.

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Correct‐by‐construction specification to verified code

Dieumegard

Jenn

et al. 2018

J Software Evolu Process

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Event‐B is a formal notation and method for the systems development. The key feature of this method is to produce correct‐by‐construction system designs. Once the correct design is established, the remaining work is to generate or implement correct code from the design. Two main problems remain in the process from the correct‐by‐construction design to the correct software. First, the Event‐B design is “quasi‐correct” due to some technical limitations. For instance, it is still difficult to prove the liveness properties by the Rodin platform; it is not possible to construct the Event‐B design with floating‐point arithmetic, and sometimes, the Event‐B model is incomplete and must rely on the third‐party libraries. Therefore, a method is needed to complement these modeling and proof gaps. Secondly, proving the correctness of an automatic code generator is very difficult; therefore, a method is needed to guarantee the correctness of the produced code without proving the code generator. In this article, we address the above 2 problems by introducing an intermediate formal language called High‐Level Language (HLL) between the Event‐B models and the C code. The Event‐B model is translated to HLL with an additional schedule configuration, where Event‐B invariants and system invariants (here, deadlock‐freeness and liveness properties) are proved using a SAT‐based model checker called S3. This proof guarantees the correctness of the HLL model with respect to the Event‐B model. The C code is then automatically generated from the HLL model for most functions and is manually implemented for the third‐party ones according to the function contracts defined in Event‐B. The correctness of the generated C code is guaranteed using the equivalence proof, and the correctness of the implemented C code is guaranteed using the conformance proof. Through the article, we use a traffic light controller to illustrate the proposed method; then, we apply the method to an automatic protection function of a 3‐wheeled robot to evaluate its feasibility.

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Industrial Deployment of System Engineering Methods

Cited by 32 publications

References 5 publications

Developing a Framework for Trustworthy Autonomous Maritime Systems

Developing a Framework for Trustworthy Autonomous Maritime Systems

Change Impact Analysis for Refinement-Based Formal Specification

Correct‐by‐construction specification to verified code

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