Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers

Busch, Marc L.; Reinhardt, Eric

doi:10.2307/2991816

Cited by 100 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…A large literature suggests that social cleavages are likely to have very different effects when the groups they define are concentrated than when they are dispersed (e.g., Bush and Reinhardt 1999;Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003;Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin 1999;Toft 2003). To the extent that variation across countries in the spatial distribution of groups affects the impact of ethnic diversity on policy formation and growth, this aspect of the causal process will be left out of the analysis.…”

Section: General Problems With Measuring Ethnic Diversitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa

Posner¹

2004

American Journal of Political Science

144

202

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In most studies of the impact of ethnic diversity on economic growth, diversity is hypothesized to affect growth throughI n 1997, William Easterly and Ross Levine published an article titled "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions" (Easterly and Levine 1997), which found a statistically and economically important negative effect of ethnic diversity on economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Specifically, Easterly and Levine (hereafter E&L) found that moving from an ethnically homogeneous country to one with a diversity of ethnic communities corresponded with a decrease in annual economic growth rates of more than 2 percent. They then applied this finding to Africa, reasoning that, because African countries are typically ethnically diverse, the strong link between ethnic heterogeneity and slow growth was quite likely an important part of the explanation for that region's "growth tragedy." E&L's findings have been broadly accepted. Thanks largely to their article, it is now de rigueur for economists Daniel N. Posner is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472 (dposner@polisci.ucla.edu).I thank Kanchan Chandra, James Fearon, Asim Khwaja, David Laitin, Drew Linzer, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Steven Wilkinson, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments, as well as members of the Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes (LiCEP) and participants at seminars at the World Bank, the Claremont Graduate School, and the UCLA Von Gremp Workshop in Economic History. Drew Linzer, Johanna Birnir, Robert Dowd, Bernadeta Killian, Elin Skaar, Lahra Smith, and Susanna Wing provided valuable research assistance. All errors are my own.

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Section: General Problems With Measuring Ethnic Diversitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa

Posner¹

2004

American Journal of Political Science

144

202

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“…See, for example, Hansen (1990) and Busch and Reinhardt (1999). Grossman and Helpman (2005) and Willmann (2005) show in a small-country trade model how asymmetries in the distribution of industries across constituencies may lead to a protectionist bias in national legislators.…”

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confidence: 99%

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Conconi

Facchini

Zanardi

2012

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

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Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for international trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that representatives of constituencies with higher stakes in import-competing industries tend to vote against FTA, while representatives of more export-oriented constituencies might vote in favor or against, depending on the degree of protectionism of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA voting decisions taken by Congress provides strong support for the predictions of our model. We also show that lack of FTA tends to skew the outcomes of trade negotiations in favor of the home country. This might help to explain why other countries are reluctant to negotiate trade agreements with the United States in the absence of FTA. JEL classifications: D72, F13

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“…Such a method should avert potential heteroskedasticity to bias our results. Heteroskedastic models like this one have been frequently used to explore heterogenous behaviors (Alvarez and Brehm, 1997, 1998Busch and Reinhardt, 1999;Gabel, 1998;Lee, 2002;Krutz, 2005). So far, heteroskedastic probit and heteroskedastic ordered probit models are the most used tools in investigating discrete heterogenous choices.…”

Section: Extensions To the Baseline Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjective Well-Being, Income and Relative Concerns in the UK

Distante

2012

Soc Indic Res

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We present an empirical model aimed at testing the relative income hypothesis and the e¤ect of deprivation relative to mean income on subjective well-being.The main concern is to deal with subjective panel data in an ordered response model where error homoskedasticity is not assumed. A heteroskedastic pooled panel ordered probit model with unobserved individual-speci…c e¤ects is applied to micro-data available in the British Household Panel Survey for 1996-2007. In this framework, absolute income impacts negatively on both completely satis…ed and dissatis…ed individuals, while relative income a¤ects positively the most satis…ed ones. Such an e¤ect is asymmetric, impacting more severely on the relatively poor in the reference group. We argue that our results buttress the validity of the relative income hypothesis as an explanation of the happiness paradox.

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Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers

Cited by 100 publications

References 29 publications

Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa

Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Subjective Well-Being, Income and Relative Concerns in the UK

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