Industrial Location and Voter Participation in Europe

Busch, Marc L.; Reinhardt, Eric

doi:10.1017/s0007123405000360

Cited by 31 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“… 10 Historically, land is taken as the best example of a purely specific asset. For instance, see the discussions in Ziblatt (2008) and Busch and Reinhardt (2005, esp. 715).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered

2012

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T he effects of inequality and financial globalization on democratization are central issues in political science. The relationships among economic inequality, capital mobility, and democracy differ in the late twentieth century for financially integrated autocracies vs. closed autocracies. Financial integration enables native elites to create diversified international asset portfolios. Asset diversification decreases both elite stakes in and collective action capacity for opposing democracy. Financial integration also changes the character of capital assets-including land-by altering the uses of capital assets and the nationality of owners. It follows that financially integrated autocracies, especially those with high levels of inequality, are more likely to democratize than unequal financially closed autocracies. We test our argument for a panel of countries in the post-World War II period. We find a quadratic hump relationship between inequality and democracy for financially closed autocracies, but an upward sloping relationship between inequality and democratization for financially integrated autocracies.

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“… 10 Historically, land is taken as the best example of a purely specific asset. For instance, see the discussions in Ziblatt (2008) and Busch and Reinhardt (2005, esp. 715).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered

2012

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“…The availability of the commodity‐level data is critical in controlling for various commodity‐specific factors such as elasticity or geographic concentration. For example, Busch and Reinhardt demonstrate that geographic concentration of industry affects incidence of industrial protection significantly, “regardless of how the political map is drawn” (Busch and Reinhardt 2005). But the problem is that it is extremely difficult to directly measure the geographic concentration of agricultural commodities across different countries.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries

Park

Jensen

2007

American J Political Sci

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Agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue, yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue. We consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Based on Cox (1987Cox ( , 1990 and Myerson (1993), we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to appeal to a narrow constituency tend to have a higher level of agricultural support. We test this theoretical hypothesis using OECD agricultural support data disaggregated by commodity and country. A cross-classified multilevel model is employed to account for complex variation of agricultural support across countries, commodities, and time. Our empirical results show that electoral systems that encourage politicians to target narrow (broad) constituencies are associated with relatively high (low) levels of agricultural subsidies.

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“…Since 1970, when Waldo Tobler published his famous “Tobler's First Law,” social scientists have noticed the broad impact of spatial autocorrelation on social actors and social actions (Anselin, ; Miller, ). A number of empirical studies have also confirmed that spatial distance alters the probabilities of individuals accessing the information and special conditions offered at a given place, further influencing their political opinions and behaviors (see, e.g., Busch and Reinhardt, ; Boehmke et al., ; Gimpel et al., ). The individual‐PEDB distance is thus used to estimate individuals' exposure to PEDBs.…”

Section: The Propaganda Effect Of Informal Education Facilities: a Spmentioning

confidence: 97%

Are Informal Education Facilities Effective Means for Generating Political Support? A Spatial Analysis*

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective Informal education based on public facilities, such as museums and memorials, is an important propaganda practice in authoritarian countries. However, the empirical research on this area is underdeveloped and relies on small and potentially biased samples. Method This study collects unique spatial opinion data of over 300 such informal education facilities in China merged with original survey data and conducts a systematic evaluation of this form of propaganda. Result The statistical results challenge the conventional expectation that more exposure to the informal education facilities would improve the citizens' support of and obedience to the government. Conclusion The findings reveal a backfire effect of informal education facilities in that more exposure to them reduces both citizens' political support and obedience.

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Industrial Location and Voter Participation in Europe

Cited by 31 publications

References 20 publications

The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered

The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered

Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries

Are Informal Education Facilities Effective Means for Generating Political Support? A Spatial Analysis*

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