Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets

Abstract

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Nonparametric Estimates of Demand in the California Health Insurance Exchange

“…The design of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA")-and, more generally, of publicly-sponsored, private-provided health insurance-remains an object of debate among policy makers (e.g. Einav and Levin, 2015;Handel and Kolstad, 2021;Handel and Ho, 2021). Addressing key design issues, such as the structure of premium subsidies or the types of plans to offer, requires estimating demand.…”

Evaluating and Pricing Health Insurance in Lower-Income Countries: A Field Experiment in India

“…We estimate that the optimal price of insurance falls to roughly INR 239-864 (holding constant the rates of successful insurance use) and INR 281-1217 (if unsuccessful use becomes successful use in time). 9 See Einav and Finkelstein (2011) and Handel and Ho (2021) for overviews.…”

Employer risk‐adjustment transitions with inertial consumers: Evidence from CalPERS

“…Consumers can extract value from plan choice by choosing an option that best matches their needs for risk protection, medical providers, and overall cost. When functioning properly, a well‐curated menu coupled with active consumer choice can add substantial value for an employee population, relative to an environment with no plan choice (see, e.g., Abaluck & Gruber, 2016; Handel & Ho, 2021).…”