Industry Concentration in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence

Mares, Vlad; Shor, Mikhael

doi:10.2139/ssrn.901067

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…However, the situation is considerably more complicated when values are affiliated, because the noncolluding bidder is at an informational disadvantage when his rivals form a ring, and this effect could offset the benefit from the reduction in competition. Waehrer and Perry (2003) and Mares and Shor (2008) also study the effects of mergers in second‐price auctions in private and common value environments, respectively.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bidding rings and the winner's curse

Hendricks

Porter²,

Tan

2008

The RAND J of Economics

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bidding rings and the winner's curse

Hendricks

Porter²,

Tan

2008

The RAND J of Economics

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“…In this regard, there must be a tradeoff between the benefit from informational aggregation and the reduction in competition. Under experimental circumstances, conversely, Mares and Shor (2008) demonstrate that the former is dominated by the latter. The bid price would increase-in our public procurement context-because of less competition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Joint Bidding In Infrastructure Procurement

Estache

Iimi²

2008

Policy Research Working Papers

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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“…Mares and Shor (2008a) shows that auctioneer's expected procurement costs would be increased by joint bidding even under the common value framework, if private signals are independent. In an experiment, Mares and Shor (2008b) demonstrate that the bid price tends to increase – in our public procurement context – with coalitional bidding because of reduced competition. Whether joint bidding increases government procurement costs must be of necessity answered empirically.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs:a Case of Road Projects*

Estache

Iimi²

2009

Ann Public Coop Econ

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To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. *

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Industry Concentration in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence

Cited by 6 publications

References 25 publications

Bidding rings and the winner's curse

Bidding rings and the winner's curse

Joint Bidding In Infrastructure Procurement

Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs:a Case of Road Projects*

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