Industry Equilibrium with Open Source and Proprietary Firms

Coexistence of Private Firms and Open Source Firms Under Spillovers and Consumer Bias

“…4 Atal and Shankar (2014) model the open source development through quality competition in a public good setting. A closely related study is Llanes and Elejalde (2013) Among the dynamic models studied, Yıldırım (2006) considers the free-rider problem when the incentive to induce others to contribute by contributing more is present. 7 Caulkins et al (2013) He characterizes the conditions under which supporting is optimal and also shows that a larger open source programmers' community does not necessarily increase the welfare.…”

Investment Incentives in Proprietary and Open-Source Two-Sided Platforms

“…Finally, suppose that the investment cost of developer j is σ(j) and that σ j > 0. Application prices are v n + α z x (x(j)), which means that α z x (x(j)) represents the private benefit of investment for developer j (Llanes and de Elejalde, 2013). Optimal investments solve m v n = σ(j) − α m z x (x(j)).…”

“…These papers, however, assume that investment incentives are exogenously given (generally, investment in open source is a function of the number of users). The exception is Llanes and de Elejalde (2013), who assume that investment is performed by sellers of complementary goods. In addition, for the most part, the literature on mixed duopoly presents models of one-sided firms.…”

Research on Metallurgical Project Design and Practices: Case Study CCTEC Co. Ltd.

“…The increase in the allocation for CSR is difficult to imagine, therefore it is still limited. This limitation is the origin of industry culture centered on profit where cost, quality and schedule were key factors to ensure super profit [27]. Actually, China is the country of destination of American and European industrialists to set up annex industries.…”