Industry Self-Regulation and Environmental Protection

King, Andrew A.; Prado, Andrea; Rivera, Jorge

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199584451.003.0006

Cited by 25 publications

(49 citation statements)

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“…In summary, we propose that while regulatory mandates will similarly impact both new entrants and diversifying incumbents, de alio firms will be more highly encouraged by economic incentives than de novo firms (King, Prado, and Rivera, ; Lenox, ). For de alio firms, incentives economically legitimate the emerging segment and build the market, allowing greater justification of entry with extant stakeholders.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the sociocultural determinants ofde novoversusde alioentry in emerging industries

York

Lenox

2013

Strategic Management Journal

131

104

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The influence of institutional factors on firm entry has long interested strategy scholars. However, we have limited understanding of how the sociocultural environment, defined as the unwritten, decentralized “rules of the game,” influences founding rates in emergent industries; we know even less about how these noneconomic factors differentially influence entry by new entrepreneurial (de novo) firms versus diversifying incumbent (de alio) firms. Utilizing a unique dataset on entry in the green building supply industry, we find that, while economic and policy factors are highly correlated with de alio entry, the sociocultural environment exerts a greater influence on de novo firms. Our findings contribute to the literature on corporate demography, institutions and entrepreneurship, and industry emergence. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the sociocultural determinants ofde novoversusde alioentry in emerging industries

York

Lenox

2013

Strategic Management Journal

131

104

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“…Nevertheless, one of the primary motives considered in the industry self-regulation literature is the use of certifications as signals to reduce asymmetric information between exchange partners (King et al 2005;King and Toffel 2007;King et al 2011). Certification programs can help firms communicate unobservable product characteristics to their customers (King et al 2002).…”

Section: Producer Ethical Certification Programsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deepening Understanding of Certification Adoption and Non-Adoption of International-Supplier Ethical Standards

Prado

Woodside

2014

J Bus Ethics

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This study presents a theory of causally complex configurations of antecedent conditions influencing the adoption versus non-adoption of international supplier ethical certification-standards. Using objective measures of antecedents and outcomes, a large-scale study of exporting firms in the cut-flower industry in two South American countries (Colombia and Ecuador) supports the theory. The theory includes the following and additional propositions. No single (simple)-antecedent condition is sufficient for accurately predicting a high membership score in outcome conditions; the outcome conditions include a firm's adoption or rejection of a product certification. No single (simple)-antecedent condition is necessary for accurately predicting high scores in the outcome condition. A few complex antecedent conditions (configurations) are sufficient but the occurrence of each is not necessary for accurately predicting high scores (e.g., adoption) in an outcome condition. Causal asymmetry of antecedent conditions indicating adoption versus non-adoption of specific ethical standards occursthat is, causal conditions leading to rejection are not the mirror opposites of causal conditions leading to adoption.

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“…The results of such coordinated industry self‐regulation schemes are mixed. There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that shows that these schemes often do not fix the problems they are designed to solve (King, Prado, & Rivera, ). For example, the individual environmental performance of participants in the U.S. chemical industry’s Responsible Care, the ISO 14001 environmental management standard, and sustainable agriculture schemes are no better than the environmental performance of nonparticipants (Blackman & Rivera, ; Gamper‐Rabindran & Finger, ; Russo & Harrison, ).…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior literature on collaboration with competitors and industry self‐regulation has recognized the importance of the size of the collective action (Olson, ; Ostrom, ) and governance arrangements, such as the degree to which a standard is adopted by industry members (e.g., Bartley, ; King et al, ) and the economies gained by pooling lobbying or communications efforts (e.g., Barnett & King, ). The self‐regulation literature has not, however, spoken to the salience of the scale of the issue.…”

Section: Theory Buildingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scale matters:The scale of environmental issues in corporate collective actions

Bowen

Bansal

Slawinski

2018

Strategic Management Journal

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Research Summary: Much of the research on corporate collective action to manage common pool resources is focused on coordinated actions, such as voluntary programs, rather than collaborative actions, such as technology sharing. In this article, we examine inductively the collective actions taken by a consortium of 12 oil sands companies to address three environmental issues of different scale. We identified a set of organizing rules that determined whether the relationship among industry members would be collaborative or competitive, and found that the organizing rules for collaborative collective action were more effective for smaller scale issues (i.e., tailings ponds and water) than the larger scale issue (i.e., greenhouse gas emissions). Our findings contribute to research on the competitive dynamics of collaborating with competitors and on industry self‐regulation. Managerial Summary: Many environmental issues, such as climate change, water quality, and contaminated land, are caused by the overexploitation of commonly shared natural resources. Firms will often overuse resources because their cost of use is less than the benefit that accrues. In Alberta’s oil sands, 12 of the major oil sands operators, all competitors, have agreed to collaborate by sharing technology, which goes against the received wisdom of competition. This multiparty collaboration among competitors, while still relatively rare, is becoming increasingly commonplace. In this article, we outline the rules that allow this collaboration to flourish. Our most important finding is that the rules are shaped by the scale of the issue being managed, not the size of the collaboration.

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Industry Self-Regulation and Environmental Protection

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

Exploring the sociocultural determinants ofde novoversusde alioentry in emerging industries

Exploring the sociocultural determinants ofde novoversusde alioentry in emerging industries

Deepening Understanding of Certification Adoption and Non-Adoption of International-Supplier Ethical Standards

Scale matters:The scale of environmental issues in corporate collective actions

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