2020
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12493
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Industry tournament incentives and audit fees

Abstract: I examine whether industry tournament incentives of CEOs are associated with audit fees. I find that industry tournament incentives, measured by the compensation gap between a CEO under consideration and the secondhighest-paid CEO among similar industries, reduce audit fees. Also, this effect is more pronounced for firms with a high level of mobility and managerial ability. To establish causality, I employ a difference-in-differences approach to compare the change in audit fees before and after the implementat… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 123 publications
(153 reference statements)
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“…Therefore, the aggressiveness driven by high CEO–CFO pay disparities are beneficial to firms. Our findings support the value‐creating strategic investment hypothesis (Huang et al., 2019; Tan, 2021) in regard to tournament incentives.…”
Section: Implications For Firm Valuesupporting
confidence: 88%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Therefore, the aggressiveness driven by high CEO–CFO pay disparities are beneficial to firms. Our findings support the value‐creating strategic investment hypothesis (Huang et al., 2019; Tan, 2021) in regard to tournament incentives.…”
Section: Implications For Firm Valuesupporting
confidence: 88%
“…Our results suggest that the CEO–CFO pay disparities provide CFOs with tournament incentives that prompt CFOs to expend greater effort in selecting value‐enhancing projects, which in turn increases firm outputs. Our findings are consistent with the value‐creating strategic investment hypothesis suggested by prior study (Huang et al., 2019; Tan, 2021).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 93%
“…document distortions in corporate disclosure driven by industry tournament incentives. Tan (2021) shows evidence of industry tournament incentives reducing audit fees. It is widely recognized that innovation is a significant driver of long-run economic growth.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chen et al (2015) add to this literature by showing that executive risk incentives embedded in the compensation contracts also explain the pricing of auditing services. Tan (2021) documents that industry tournament incentives of CEOs, derived from the compensation gap, affects audit fees. Executive compensation is mainly determined by the board of directors, related to several firm characteristics and strategies, and frequently changes over time.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%