Inefficient Unanimity

Brennan, Geoffrey; Lomasky, Loren Ε.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00195.x

Cited by 38 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…firms (Sherman and Willett 1967), voting behavior (Brennan and Lomasky 1984), the sanctioning dilemma of N actors facing a norm violation, the investment decision of two or more privileged actors in a "privileged group" (Olson 1965), bystander intervention in emergencies as analyzed by Darley and Latan6 (1968) in social psychology, and "vigilance games" in biology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in an asymmetric Volunteer's dilemma game theory and experimental evidence

Diekmann

1993

Int J Game Theory

104

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Abstract:The symmetric Volunteer's dilemma game (VOD) models a situation in which each of N actors faces the decision of either producing a step-level collective good (action "C") or freeriding CD'). One player's cooperative action suffices for producing the collective good. Unilateral cooperation yields a payoff U for D-players and U-K for the cooperative player(s). However, if all actors decide for "freeriding", each player's payoff is zero (U>K>0). In this article, an essential modification is discussed. In an asymmetric VOD, the interest in the collective good and/or, the production costs (i.e. U or K) may vary between actors. The generalized asymmetric VOD is similar to market entry games. Alternative hypotheses about the behaviour of subjects are derived from a game-theoretical analysis. They are investigated in an experimental setting. The application of the mixed Nash-equilibrium concept yields a rather counter-intuitive prediction which apparently contradicts the empirical data. The predictions of the Harsanyi-Selten-theory and Schelling's "focal point theory" are in better accordance with the data. However, they do not account for the "diffusion-of-responsibility-effect" also observable in the context of an asymmetric VOD game.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in an asymmetric Volunteer's dilemma game theory and experimental evidence

Diekmann

1993

Int J Game Theory

104

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“…1 above, to "not winning (or winning) incumbency and suffering from a second or third-best alternative which prevails", which can be identified with the 0 event in Fig. 2 has been labeled "Volunteer's Dilemma" (Diekmann, 1985; see also Brennan andLomasky, 1984, andHoller, 1986a, for a discussion of this game). 3.…”

Section: Alternative Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

An indifference trap of voting

Holler

1988

Qual Quant

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In this paper strategic situations of voting and abstentions are analysed in a three-candidate voting model where voters are indifferent to various alternatives and candidates are interested in winning the election and seeing their most preferred alternative being realized. A specific decision problem is analysed, described by an Indifference Trap Game, with respect to, e.g., the corresponding Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, and maximin solution. A second-best outcome is contained in the choice set of all three solutions while the Nash equilibrium concept is compatible with the Pareto efficient outcomes of the game.An alternative scenario where candidates suffer from incumbency but voters still are indifferent to some alternatives also supports the second-best outcome. Again, various solutions concepts are applied. We conclude that indifferent voters imply an eminent coordination problem for the candidates in the given voting game which, in general, ends up in inefficient outcomes. The inherent complexity of the decision situation cannot be sufficiently reduced to single out one and only one outcome.

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“…To be fair it should be noted that Cebula and Kafoglis (1983: 200) Brennan and Lomasky (1984) who criticize the notion that unanimous decisions are necessarily efficient ones. 3.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

In search of optimum ?relative unanimity?: A comment

Brooks

1987

Public Choice

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Inefficient Unanimity

Cited by 38 publications

References 10 publications

Cooperation in an asymmetric Volunteer's dilemma game theory and experimental evidence

Cooperation in an asymmetric Volunteer's dilemma game theory and experimental evidence

An indifference trap of voting

In search of optimum ?relative unanimity?: A comment

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