Inequality and welfare state clientelism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

Inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is rampant, manifested not only through one of the highest Gini coefficients in Europe but also in unequal access to social benefits and services. We find this to be an outcome of BiH?s entitygovernment social policy, which has been created to serve ethnic clientelistic politics. As the country?s former social protection system adjusted in the immediate post-civil war period to a new asymmetric government structure made of two entities, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, it helped the main ethnic political parties preserve their power and ethnic divisions. This was achieved through a comprehensive system of status-based social benefits, most notably war-related social benefits granted on the basis of ethnic and military service affiliation. As such, in both BiH?s entities the system of social protection is an instrument of political control that generates inequality by treating certain social groups differently in terms of access to and level of benefits, while excluding much of the population. The process is found to be endogenous; in other words, maintaining inequality in access to social benefits is essential for preserving clientelistic policy, and vice versa.

Social protection expenditure and redistribution in the Western Balkans

“…They were also increasing their spending on the “Other” category, in contrast with the EU. While here the EU spent on programmes such as housing, family and social inclusion, in the Western Balkan countries, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, the “other” line of expenditure involved particularistic social programmes, such as those for veterans and the casualties of war and former political prisoners (Mustafa & Haxhikadrija, 2019; Obradović & Filic, 2019; Obradović & Jusić, 2019). At the same time, the Western Balkans’ healthcare and unemployment protection expenditure was declining, in contrast to the trend in the EU.…”

“…While wars have usually had expenditures legacies for welfare states (Obinger, Petersen, & Starke, 2018), in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina the clientelist relationship of veteran groups with certain political parties has resulted in an extensive share of permanent cash benefits for these groups which are also tied to other tax and service rights (see eg. Mustafa & Haxhikadrija, 2019; Obradović & Filic, 2019). In Albania, particularistic rights have been connected more with what Esping-Andersen (1990) calls “etatist” institutions, such as special pensions for high political and state officials and, as in Kosovo, it has a scheme to protect former political prisoners of socialism.…”

Social innovation in a post-conflict setting: examining external factors affecting social service NGOs

“…Roma), low-income residents of rural areas, single parents, the elderly, and refugees (Papić et al 2013). The reason for this is that the public social services sector in BiH faces several challenges, including unharmonized legislations across the highly fragmented system of governance, poor human, technical and financial resources, lack of preventive care services, and political clientelism (Maglajlic and Stubbs 2017;Obradović and Filic 2019). Consequently, non-state provision of preventive social services helps to improve the living conditions of vulnerable groups, given that the public welfare institutions have failed to respond adequately.…”

Introduction: social protection in the Western Balkans

“…As unemployment increased dramatically, countries instituted austerity programmes throughout the Western Balkans and politics turned to more illiberal and authoritarian forms of government, state capture and clientelism (Bieber, 2020). In Macedonia, the 10-year rule of the VMRO-DPMNE political party led to social policy reforms that supported non-poor groups of voters (Gerovska-Mitev, 2019) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar clientelistic pressures led to support for non-poor voters (Obradović & Filić, 2019).…”