Inequality, Self-Interest, and Public Support for “Robin Hood” Tax Policies

Abstract

Influential economic models predict that as inequality increases, the public will demand greater redistribution. However, there is limited research into the determinants of support for redistributive tax increases because such proposals have been so rare in America in recent decades. We use Washington State’s Proposition 1098 to examine how economic self-interest, concerns about inequality, and partisanship influence support for redistributive taxation. The results show that all of these factors influenced support, with strong support among the lower income, indicating that when the distributional implications of policies are clear, citizens can translate their self-interest and broad attitudes into congruent redistributive preferences.

Process over outcome: How perceptions of procedural fairness influence conservative support for redistributive taxes

“…Primarily, the dominant view assumes that if poor conservatives could somehow sort through the misinformation and partisan rhetoric they would not oppose redistributive taxes (Franko et al, 2013). This paradox of conservative opposition for wealth redistribution is a commonly cited manifestation of the misrepresentation of poor Americans by the dominant US political parties (Bartels, 2008;Frank, 2004;Hacker & Pierson, 2011;Light, 1999;Page & Jacobs, 2009;Winters & Page, 2009).…”

“…Public support for specific policies is dependent on how the issue is framed by political elites (Franko et al, 2013). For instance, one might be supportive of raising taxes to pay for a social safety net in the abstract, but opposed to the idea that the wealthy should shoulder more of the burden, or that money should be taken from the wealthy and given to the poor.…”

“…party leaders (p. 210). In this view, poor conservatives oppose redistributive policies either because they are uninformed about the policy implications (Franko, Tolbert, & Witko, 2013), or because they are misrepresented by their party (Frank, 2004;Page & Jacobs, 2009).…”

Divided by the Market, Divided by the State: Distribution, Redistribution and Welfare Attitudes in 47 Countries

“…A second question is whether individual differences in welfare attitudes can be explained by material self‐interest. Most empirical contributions do find such pocketbook effects or a mix between self‐interest and fundamental social and political values (Fong ; Doherty et al ; Lynch & Myrskylä ; Breznau ; Franko et al ; Calzada et al ; Owens & Pedulla ). In terms of the third question, some studies have looked at the institutional context of welfare opinions and examined, for example, the effect of welfare state regimes on attitudes.…”

Political and Policy Responses to Problems of Inequality and Opportunity: Past, Present, and Future

“…The temporary nature of the tax hike may be as important as the commitment to funding opportunity-enhancing policies. A similar ballot measure failed in Washington state in part because, it is speculated, the measure left open the possibility that the legislature could vote in the future to increase taxes lower down in the income distribution (Franko et al 2013 ). A later and more widely publicized example of an "equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities" approach came with Bill de Blasio's successful 2013 mayoral campaign in New York City, the centerpiece of which was a promise to raise income taxes on the wealthy in order to fund universal preschool education.…”