Humans speak, monkeys grunt, and ducks quack. How do we come to know which vocalizations animals produce? Here we explore this question by asking whether young infants expect humans, but not other animals, to produce speech, and further, whether infants have similarly restricted expectations about the sources of vocalizations produced by other species. Five-month-old infants matched speech, but not human nonspeech vocalizations, specifically to humans, looking longer at static human faces when human speech was played than when either rhesus monkey or duck calls were played. They also matched monkey calls to monkey faces, looking longer at static rhesus monkey faces when rhesus monkey calls were played than when either human speech or duck calls were played. However, infants failed to match duck vocalizations to duck faces, even though infants likely have more experience with ducks than monkeys. Results show that by 5 months of age, human infants generate expectations about the sources of some vocalizations, mapping human faces to speech and rhesus faces to rhesus calls. Infants' matching capacity does not appear to be based on a simple associative mechanism or restricted to their specific experiences. We discuss these findings in terms of how infants may achieve such competence, as well as its specificity and relevance to acquiring language.cognitive development ͉ language acquisition ͉ speech perception ͉ conspecific ͉ evolution H umans' intuitive understanding of physical aspects of the world, such as object identity, continuity, and motion, has its roots in infancy. Carey (1) proposed that children's intuitive understanding of biology is built on their intuitive understanding of psychology, beginning with an understanding of human behavior which is then generalized along a similarity gradient to other animals. Others, such as Keil (2) and Hatano (3), have argued that biology is its own privileged domain of knowledge with dedicated inferential mechanisms. Whichever account is correct, an understanding of the biology of different species requires an understanding of differing properties of those species. Many studies (e.g., 4-6) have shown that infants use visible properties to distinguish between instances of different categories (e.g., dogs vs. cats), but ultimately, categories function to support inferences about unseen properties (7,8). We investigate what infants might know or infer about the kinds of vocalizations that different species produce.The vocalizations that animals produce are often species specific: distinctive and functional in providing information about individual and group identity, motivational state, location, and often the triggering contexts (9-13). At the same time, vocalizations contain information about the vocal tract that produced them, effectively functioning as a species-specific signature (14-16). The recognition of vocalizations is especially important because they can help identify and localize conspecifics, predators, and prey, even when those organisms may not be within the ...