Inferentialism and Singular Reference

McCullagh, Mark

doi:10.1080/00455091.2005.10716587

Cited by 18 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The most serious concern, as pointed out by McCullagh (), is that the notion of a primary sentence is left undefined. There is a SMSIC connecting ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’.…”

Section: Other Responsesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s in a Name

Parisi

2017

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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This paper offers a response to Ramsey's famous challenge to draw a logical, as opposed to merely syntactical, distinction between names and predicates. Three attempts to meet this challenge are considered, one from Dummett, one from Geach, and one from Brandom. It is shown that none of these adequately addresses Ramsey's challenge. The paper concludes with a response to Ramsey that avoids the pitfalls of the other three replies. The advantage of the view proposed is that there is nothing preventing the set of sentences in consideration from consisting only of atomic sentences. The upshot of my solution is that the distinction between names and properties rests on the presence of relational predicates in a language and the validity of the structural rules of identity, contraction, and cut.

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“…The most serious concern, as pointed out by McCullagh (), is that the notion of a primary sentence is left undefined. There is a SMSIC connecting ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’.…”

Section: Other Responsesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s in a Name

Parisi

2017

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…For an excellent overview over trope theory seeMaurin (2013).5 For critical discussions see, e.g.,McCullagh (2006) andKremer (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

How the Modalities Come into the World

Spohn

2017

Erkenn

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The modalities come into the world by being projections or objectivizations of our epistemic constitution. Thus this paper is a statement of Humean projectivism. In fact, it goes beyond Simon Blackburn's version. It is also designed as a comprehensive counter-program to David Lewis' program of Humean supervenience. In detail, the paper explains: (1) Already the basic fact that the world is a world of states of affairs is due to the nature of our epistemic states. ( 2) Objects (and properties and relations), which figure in states of affairs and which embody metaphysical modality, are constitutable by their essential properties and in fact constituted by us according to our ontological policies. (3) What the facts are, to which the correspondence notion of truth refers, is determined by applying an epistemic or pragmatic notion of truth to the world. (4) Causation is a specific objectivization of our conditional beliefs. (5) Nomicity is a 'habit of belief' (Ramsey), a specific way of generalizing epistemic attitudes. This covers the basic metaphysical and natural modalities. The paper attempts to convey that talking of projection or objectivization is not just imagery, but a constructively realizable program.

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Robert Brandom’s Normative Inferentialism

Turbanti

2017

Pragmatics &Amp; Beyond New Series

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The philosophy of language of Robert Brandom is based on a theoretical structure composed of three main elements: the normative analysis of linguistic practices, the inferential characterization of conceptual contents and the expressive articulation of the relations between the former two. Normative pragmatics aims to explain how linguistic practices are sufficient to confer contentful states in those who engage in them. Inferential semantics provides a theory of such pragmatic significances in terms of the inferential relations that articulate conceptual contents. Rational expressivism is the thesis that concept application is essentially a process of turning something that can only be done into something that can also be said. Such a threefold structure is the core of normative inferentialism. This book is a concise, self-contained and comprehensive presentation of this philosophical enterprise. It guides the reader through the analysis of Brandom's imposing theoretical apparatus, the discovery of the roots of his approach in American pragmatism and German idealism, till the exploration of some of its most interesting and recent outcomes in pragmatics and semantics. It is a valuable resource for both those who approach Brandom's work for the first time and those who are interested in the potential of normative inferentialism.

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Inferentialism and Singular Reference

Cited by 18 publications

References 8 publications

What’s in a Name

What’s in a Name

How the Modalities Come into the World

Robert Brandom’s Normative Inferentialism

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