Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank

Abstract

Asian Development Bank, Donor influence, Japan, United States, UN voting, World Bank, F35, F53, F55, O19,

Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences

“…Why has lending by the relatively littleknown CAF grown so dramatically, to the point where it lent more than either the World Bank or IADB in the last decade? The existing academic literature posits a wide range of explanations for MDB lending patterns, including realist considerations of power politics and donor interest (Babb, 2009;Dreher, Klasen, Vreeland, & Werker, 2010;Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009a, 2009bHarrigan, Wang, & El-Said, 2006;Kilby, 2006Kilby, , 2011Thacker, 1999, among many others), a rationalist focus on incentives among main actors in MDB activities (Gutner, 2005;Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1995;Vaubel, 2006), or more sociology-based constructivist interpretations of norms and staff self-image (Babb, 2003;Barnett & Finnemore, 1999Weaver, 2008;Woods, 2006). However, it is notable how little existing research considers the point of view of the borrower when attempting to understand MDB lending.…”

“…Although the World Bank has been the object of the overwhelming majority of scholarly research on MDBs, some 20-odd MDBs exist in the world, 2 and many of them lend more to their client countries than the World Bank. While academia has begun branching out beyond the World Bank, only a few studies have compared governance structures of different MDBs and attempted to systematically test the impact of those differences on operations (e.g., Gutner's, 2002, book on environmental lending in Europe and the comparisons of donor influence at different MDBs by Kilby, 2006Kilby, , 2011Kilby & Bland, 2012). Is the lending for some MDBs declining, and rising for others?…”

“…3. A number of studies have pointed to the informal influence of the U.S. in influencing the IMF, World Bank, IADB and Asian Development Bank, including Kapur (1999), Woods (2006), Stone (2008), Babb (2009), andKilby (2011). While it is undeniable that the U.S. does have informal levers of power in these institutions, we would suggest that most of the U.S.'s "informal" power at the IADB and World Bank is derived from its formal veto power over changes to the Articles of Agreement and capital structure.…”

“…In addition, existing research on MDBs focuses mainly on the World Bank, with only an incipient (though fast-growing) body of research on other MDBs such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank (see, e.g., Babb, 2009;Kilby and Bland, 2012;Gutner, 2002;Kilby, 2006Kilby, , 2011Neumayer, 2003, among others). More than 20 MDBs exist, and some are larger lenders to their particular market than the World Bank.…”

Politics of religiously motivated lending: An empirical analysis of aid allocation by the Islamic Development Bank

“…Furthermore, some authors claim that the influence over IFIs' lending decisions is essential to guarantee the engagement of powerful countries in international cooperation and therefore the survival of these institutions (Dreher et al 2009b, Copelovitch 2010. Not surprisingly, the development aid literature recognizes that major stakeholders' particular interests in borrowing countries are a key driver of resources allocated by IFIs (e.g., Thacker 1999, Dreher et al 2009a, Kilby 2011.…”