2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.03.008
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Informal sector, regulatory compliance, and leakage

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Cited by 32 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…While one can envisage many policies that positively or negatively affect the formal sector, we consider a policy such as environmental regulations driving formal firms to informal activities (viz. in Baksi and Bose, 2016).…”
Section: Rent Seeking Equilibriummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While one can envisage many policies that positively or negatively affect the formal sector, we consider a policy such as environmental regulations driving formal firms to informal activities (viz. in Baksi and Bose, 2016).…”
Section: Rent Seeking Equilibriummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, the formal sector avoids the costly regulations by outsourcing part of its production to the informal sector. Baksi and Bose (2016) modeled this process and analyzed how stringent regulations affected the size and regulatory compliance status of an endogenous informal sector through the outsourcing decision of formal firms. This study also identified the conditions under which a partially compliant informal sector acted as a source of leakage by permitting the formal sector to outsource polluting production.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, pressures from rigorous environmental legislation motivate the formal rms to hide their polluting manufacturing into the underground sectors for cost-cutting (Mazhar and Elgin, 2013). This may shift the pollution from the formal sectors to the shadow economy (Baksi and Bose, 2016). Third, according to the three-sector general equilibrium framework, formal rms may purchase immediate goods from their informal counterparts, which are not subject to environmental taxes and standards (Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay, 2006).…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%