2005
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhi024
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Information Acquisition Under Uncertainty in Credit Markets

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Cited by 15 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Consequently, in contrast to our model, increasing the value of Poor borrowers always bene…ts lenders. Also in Banerjee (2005), an improvement in a lender's screening accuracy never bene…ts a rival, whereas in our model a rival may bene…t if skimming su¢ ciently moderates 1 They restrict attention to the case when the expected returns from a borrower classi…ed as Poor is negative even at the highest interest rate, whereas the expected returns from a cross-classi…ed borrower is positive.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 74%
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“…Consequently, in contrast to our model, increasing the value of Poor borrowers always bene…ts lenders. Also in Banerjee (2005), an improvement in a lender's screening accuracy never bene…ts a rival, whereas in our model a rival may bene…t if skimming su¢ ciently moderates 1 They restrict attention to the case when the expected returns from a borrower classi…ed as Poor is negative even at the highest interest rate, whereas the expected returns from a cross-classi…ed borrower is positive.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 74%
“…Closest to our work are Broecker (1990) and Banerjee (2005). Broecker (1990) restricts all lenders to have the same screening accuracy and looks at the impact of imperfect independent screening on competition.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
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