Information and targeted spending

Nicolò, Antonio; Eguia, Jon X.

doi:10.3982/te2508

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 51 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In our model, parties' strategic actions affect the salience of platforms versus advertising, and hence voters in the society split among those casting votes either in an informed or uninformed manner. Therefore, although very different in nature, our model links with recent literature where some voters may be partially informed regarding parties' policy proposals (Aragonès and Xefteris, 2017;Eguia and Nicolò, 2018). Finally, our model contributes to the contest theory literature (see Corchón (2007); Konrad (2009); Serena and Corchón (2018) for surveys) since parties compete for a share of impressionable voters as if they were competing in a Tullock contest (with the "noise" of the latter capturing the effectiveness of electoral advertising).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 76%

Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We focus on changes in technology and campaign management to study the documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization. In our model, some voters are ideological while others are impressionable. If the distribution of voters between types is endogenous and depends on parties' platform choices, our results show that a) an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising or a decrease in the electorate's political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending, while b) a decrease in the cost of advertising does not affect neither polarization nor spending.

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 76%

Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The two most closely related papers to ours from this literature are Eguia and Nicolò [32] and Gavazza and Lizzeri [33]. In Eguia and Nicolò [32], the authors consider a similar model where each group of voters is potentially uninformed about policies targeting other groups, but are informed about policies targeting their own group. Candidates' platforms may be fully revealed to all voters by some exogenously determined process.…”

Section: Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The ability to strategically share partial information with voters is the crucial driver of our results. Gavazza and Lizzeri [33] share the information structure of Eguia and Nicolò [32] but in a model where transfers are always inefficient. We share their conclusion that more information improves efficiency, but differ in our focus on endogenizing the information available to voters.…”

Section: Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Bizzotto¹,

Solow

2019

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.

show abstract

“…In electoral competition literature, several papers apply the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) instead of SE (see, for example, Callander and Wilkie, ; Eguia and Nicolò, ). We note here that the arguments presented in Remark prove that when

ρ > 1 - min {f false(x_{1} false), f false(x_{n} false)}

, the unique SE of the game is also the unique PBE of the game.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Imperfectly Informed Voters and Strategic Extremism

Aragonès

Xefteris

2017

Int Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have imperfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate o¤ers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely o¢ ce motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advantage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a di¤erent extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.

show abstract

Information and targeted spending

Cited by 6 publications

References 51 publications

Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Imperfectly Informed Voters and Strategic Extremism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About