2013
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0143-0
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Information concentration in common value environments

Abstract: We consider how information concentration affects a seller's revenue in common value auctions. The common value is a function of n random variables partitioned among m ≤ n bidders. For each partition, the seller devises an optimal mechanism. We show that, whenever the value function allows scalar sufficient statistics for each player's signals, the mechanism design problem is well-defined. Additionally, whenever a common regularity condition is satisfied, a coarser partition always reduces revenues. In particu… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

0
0
0

Year Published

2014
2014
2014
2014

Publication Types

Select...
2

Relationship

0
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 2 publications
references
References 23 publications
0
0
0
Order By: Relevance