Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

Azacis, Helmuts

doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Corazzini et al [46] study the sequential reverse auction where each bidder's capacity is unknown to the auctioneer. Also, some studies [47], [48], [49] focus on a particular case where the sequential auction is with only two items or two bidders. Drutsa [50] presents an online learning algorithm for the repeated second-price auction with reserve where strategic bidders repeatedly participate in auctions and the seller needs to determine reserve prices in each round based on the previous information for maximizing her long-term revenue.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

EdgeDR: An Online Mechanism Design for Demand Response in Edge Clouds

Chen

Jiao

Liu

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

EdgeDR: An Online Mechanism Design for Demand Response in Edge Clouds

Chen

Jiao

Liu

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst.

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“…55Auctions with different disclosure policies are also studied in, for example, Lebrun (2010), Fan et al (2016), Bergemann and Hörner (2018), and Azacis (2020). …”

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confidence: 99%

Auctions with signaling concerns

Bos

Truyts

2020

Economics Manag Strategy

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We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second‐price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue. This is because the presence or the absence of an increasing price clock affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders' incentives to overbid their types. This leads to a strictly higher expected revenue in the second‐price auction than in the English auction. Our analysis is completed by a comparison with other disclosure policies. Applications include art auctions and charity auctions.

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“…Note that, in general, a bidder's private valuation can reflect, for example, purchasing power, a taste for art, generosity, profitability prospects, expected market penetration, or a combination of such factors. To keep the model as simple and generic as possible, we disregard how these qualities map into a private valuation, and how the receiver seeks to reverse this mapping to form beliefs about these ultimate qualities from the auction outcome.5Auctions with different disclosure policies are also studied in, for example,Lebrun (2010),Fan et al (2016),Bergemann andHörner (2018), andAzacis (2020).6…”

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confidence: 99%