2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) 2019
DOI: 10.1109/csf.2019.00028
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Information Flow Control for Distributed Trusted Execution Environments

Abstract: Distributed applications cannot assume that their security policies will be enforced on untrusted hosts. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) combined with cryptographic mechanisms enable execution of known code on an untrusted host and the exchange of confidential and authenticated messages with it. TEEs do not, however, establish the trustworthiness of code executing in a TEE. Thus, developing secure applications using TEEs requires specialized expertise and careful auditing. This paper presents DFLATE, a c… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Unlike DAC models, which primarily focus on access control within applications, IFT ensures dynamic control over data flow based on predefined security labels [36]. One more option that adds value is IFT's ability to make consumers' data be limitedly labeled [37].…”
Section: Information Flow Tracking (Ift)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unlike DAC models, which primarily focus on access control within applications, IFT ensures dynamic control over data flow based on predefined security labels [36]. One more option that adds value is IFT's ability to make consumers' data be limitedly labeled [37].…”
Section: Information Flow Tracking (Ift)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By contrast, our approach enforces robustness for a mainstream language like Java. Recent work by Gollamudi et al [42] uses enclaves to enforce more expressive confidentiality and integrity against passive attackers in a distributed setting. Like us, both works come with soundness proofs of security, with the key difference that our work targets robustness instead of variants of noninterference.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Enclaves and information flow control: Gollamudi et al [20] consider information flow control for enclave applications focusing on erasure policies. DFLATE [27] presents noninterference guarantees in distributed TEEs settings. In contrast to these works, J E provides robustness guarantees against stronger active attackers.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%