Information leakage from cryptographic hardware via common-mode current

Hayashi, Yu-ichi; Sugawara, Takeshi; Kayano, Yoshiki; Homma, Naofumi; Mizuki, Takaaki; Satoh, Akashi; Aoki, Takafumi; Minegishi, Shigeki; Sone, Hideaki; Inoue, Hiroshi

doi:10.1109/isemc.2010.5711256

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The fluctuation in voltage between VDD and GND of FPGA1 during the encryption process was observed from the J8 observation point on SASEBO-G. As mentioned earlier in this section, the EM leakage waveforms related to the processing executed in the IC can also be observed as EM radiation from the IC, the leakage of common-mode current through the connection line, and so on [11]. To verify the validity of the proposed method, we measured fluctuations in the power supply voltage of the IC, which is a relatively low-noise and reproducible source of a leakage signal.…”

Section: B Verification and Discussion Of The Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 68%

Information Leakage Threats for Cryptographic Devices Using IEMI and EM Emission

Nakamura

Hayashi

Mizuki

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Abstract-In this paper, we present a new information leakage threat combining intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) and observations of EM leakage. In previous studies, the analysis of secret key information in cryptographic modules using fault injection has led to methods whereby faults can be injected via low-voltage IEMI. However, the timing of fault injections cannot be controlled with this approach, and it is difficult to obtain faulty ciphertexts for use in secret key analysis by differential fault analysis (DFA). To overcome this problem, we propose a method for estimating the fault injection timing by detecting characteristic fluctuations in the EM leakage from the device. As a result, it may be possible to implement a realistic secret information analysis method applicable to a wide range of devices. First, to show the feasibility of the proposed method, we describe an experiment using an on-chip fault injection circuit that can control the injection timing. Furthermore, we apply a fault analysis method that combines the injection timing estimation method and fault injection by IEMI in a practical experimental environment. We select useful faulty ciphertexts using the proposed method, and then perform secret key analysis by DFA. Experimental results demonstrate that the secret key can be successfully analyzed.

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Section: B Verification and Discussion Of The Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 68%

Information Leakage Threats for Cryptographic Devices Using IEMI and EM Emission

Nakamura

Hayashi

Mizuki

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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“…Therefore, we measured the CM current by considering various transfer functions for electronic devices with different physical structures. For simplicity, we employed models of cryptographic devices rather than actual cryptographic devices [9]- [13]. Note that we only use the model in order to emulate changing transfer function depending on propagation path from a device to an area of interest.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An efficient method for estimating the area of information propagation through electromagnetic radiation

Hayashi¹,

Homma²,

Ikematsu³

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility

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Information leakage in the form of electromagnetic (EM) radiation is an emerging security issue for designers and users of electronic devices. The importance of estimating the propagation area of EM responsible for information leakage is increasing due to the high demand for protecting such devices from eavesdropping. In this paper, we propose an efficient method for estimating the propagation area of EM responsible for information leakage. The proposed idea is to examine the temporal variance of noise in the area of interest in addition to the source intensity and the transfer function. We also show that the information acquired by the proposed method is in close agreement with the actual information acquired in an area of interest by measuring leaked EM radiation. I. INTRODUCTIONCryptographic devices are vulnerable to attacks implemented by making use of side-channel information such as timing, power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiation, and such attacks are becoming a major issue for designers of such devices. In EM analysis attacks, a variety of data can be obtained by analyzing EM radiation emitted by cryptographic devices at intermediate steps of encryption and/or decryption operations, and secret information can be extracted from the obtained data by using signal processing and statistical analysis techniques. A characteristic feature of EM analysis attacks is that EM waveforms are obtained by non-contact probing.Conventional attacks are necessarily performed in extremely close proximity to the target device in order to reliably acquire EM waveforms. However, an attack method presented in [1] employs near-field probing to obtain more detailed information about an unpacked 8-bit microcontroller from the analyzed EM radiation as compared with other types of attacks. In general, such semi-invasive side-channel attacks are effective since the plastic mold around the analyzed device can be removed easily and at low cost. On the other hand, several studies [2]- [5] have demonstrated the possibility of obtaining secret keys by externally measuring EM radiation emitted from cryptographic devices. In particular, a successful EM analysis attack was carried out on an SSL accelerator in [3] by measuring the radiation emitted by the accelerator during operation. This suggests that the threat of EM analysis attacks should be considered even if it is difficult to obtain

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“…It was found that, the radiative interference patterns of TV power supplies yielded discernable information about the media being played. The work of Hayashi [68][69][70] has demonstrated the viability of obtaining secret keys from the radiation patterns of power and communication cables attached to FPGA (field programmable gate array) boards. His work has shown that, cryptographic key information may leak from near field [68] and far field [69] radiation patterns.…”

Section: Many Proofs Of the Concept Have Been Demonstratedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

López¹,

Sargolzaei²,

Santana³

et al. 2015

JEPE

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Abstract:The smart grid is the next generation of power and distribution systems. The integration of advanced network, communications, and computing techniques allows for the enhancement of efficiency and reliability. The smart grid interconnects the flow of information via the power line, intelligent metering, renewable and distributed energy systems, and a monitoring and controlling infrastructure. For all the advantages that these components come with, they remain at risk to a spectrum of physical and digital attacks. This paper will focus on digital vulnerabilities within the smart grid and how they may be exploited to form full fledged attacks on the system. A number of countermeasures and solutions from the literature will also be reported, to give an overview of the options for dealing with such problems. This paper serves as a triggering point for future research into smart grid cyber security.

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Information leakage from cryptographic hardware via common-mode current

Cited by 10 publications

References 10 publications

Information Leakage Threats for Cryptographic Devices Using IEMI and EM Emission

Information Leakage Threats for Cryptographic Devices Using IEMI and EM Emission

An efficient method for estimating the area of information propagation through electromagnetic radiation

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

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