Information seeking in capuchins (Cebus apella): A rudimentary form of metacognition?

Abstract

In previous research, great apes and rhesus macaques have demonstrated multiple apparently metacognitive abilities, whereas capuchin monkeys have not. The present experiment investigated whether at least a rudimentary form of metacognition might be demonstrated in capuchins if a simplified metacognitive task was used. Capuchins (Cebus apella) were required to locate a food reward hidden beneath one of two inverted cups that sat on a Plexiglas tray. In some conditions, the capuchins were shown where the food was hidden, in others they could infer its location, and in yet others they were not given information about the location of the food. On all trials, capuchins could optionally seek information about the food's location by looking up through the Plexiglas beneath the cups. In general, capuchins did this less often when they were shown the food reward, but not when they could infer the reward's location. These data suggest that capuchins-if metacognitive-only metacognitively control their information seeking in some conditions, particularly those in which information is presented in the visual domain. This may represent a rudimentary version of metacognitive control, in comparison with that seen in great apes and humans.

Not knowing what one knows: A Meaningful failure of metacognition in capuchin monkeys.

“…Thus, there was limited evidence in favor of the monkeys showing metacognition and control processes. Vining and Marsh (2015) arranged a capuchin information-seeking experiment in which they found that capuchin monkeys met some but not all of the predictions that support a claim of metacognitive monitoring. The monkeys had to locate food hidden under a cup and had the opportunity to examine the cups by looking beneath the transparent Plexiglas tray holding the cups.…”

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk.

“…Vinings and Marsh (2015) also reported that capuchin monkeys responded differently in terms of information-seeking responses when the number of response options varied. In that case, capuchin monkeys went from showing near-ceiling levels of information-seeking responses where there were more choices to more appropriate information-seeking responses when there were only two choices (i.e., they sought information more when they had not seen where the item was hidden compared to when they had).…”

“…They sometimes fail to search appropriately by either looking for food when they have not seen where it is hidden, or reaching directly when they have seen the hiding location (Basile et al, 2009; Paukner et al, 2006), a test that is passed by chimpanzees (Call, 2010; Call & Carpenter, 2001) and rhesus macaques (Hampton et al, 2004). Even though they sometimes do seek information more often when they need to in order to be successful, not all capuchin monkeys show this pattern, and they also fail to use inferences as a means of obtaining information in this kind of test (Vinings & Marsh, 2015). Some capuchin monkeys also fail to assess their own memory strength and do not seem to avoid taking memory tests they are likely to fail (Fujita, 2009) whereas macaques generally do appropriately avoid difficult memory tests (Hampton, 2001).…”

Assessment of metacognitive monitoring and control in baboons (Papio papio)

“…Discussions have been driven by these apparent species differences (Smith et al , 2012Carruthers and Ritchie 2012), but the evolutionary history of metacognitive skills in nonhuman primates remains largely uncertain. Beran et al (2014) and Vining and Marsh (2015) recently reported some limited evidence that capuchins could rely on metacognitive monitoring and control strategies under some conditions. Testing of additional primate species-baboons, in the current study-is thus desirable is this context to more precisely document the evolution of metacognitive skills in animals.…”