Information sharing and the impact of shutdown policy in a supply chain with market disruption risk in the social media era

Wang, Jiancai; Wang, Yao-Yu; Che, Tong

doi:10.1016/j.im.2018.09.005

Cited by 28 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…As a result, information sharing cannot be achieved. Similar results can also be found in Shamir [35], Bian et al [4], Ha et al [14], Shin and Tunca [34] and Shang et al [33], Wu et al [40] and Wang et al [38]. Li and Zhang [23] examine the effect of confidentiality on the incentive of demand information sharing.…”

Section: Literature Reviewsupporting

confidence: 76%

Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

2021

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We consider ex post demand information sharing and leakage in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers competing in quantities. The incumbent retailer has an advantage to acquire information about the market at a cost. If he invests in information acquisition, he privately acquires a signal about the market demand. We examine the incumbent’s incentive of information acquisition and sharing, and the upstream supplier’s information leakage strategy. We confirm that the incumbent’s information acquisition and sharing decisions depend on whether the information acquisition is observable. When it is observable, the incumbent fully shares his private signals even though the shared high signal may hurt him. However, when it is unobservable, the incumbent can share the favorable signal (low signal) and withhold the unfavorable signal (high signal). Moreover, we also find that the supplier will always leak the signal to the entrant no matter what signal she acquires. In addition, we demonstrate under the information sharing and leakage strategy, it may benefit the whole supply chain when the retail competition intensity is not very large.

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Section: Literature Reviewsupporting

confidence: 76%

Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

2021

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“…Within a one‐to‐one supply chain, Wang et al. (2019) investigate when the manufacturer would like to share demand information with the supplier by incorporating the shutdown policy. Zhang et al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the vertical information sharing problem, different supply chain structures are analyzed. Within a one-to-one supply chain, Wang et al (2019) investigate when the manufacturer would like to share demand information with the supplier by incorporating the shutdown policy. Zhang et al (2017) consider that a supplier produces relief goods and sells them through the manufacturer during market disruptions.…”

Section: Information-sharing Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovation information sharing between two competitive supply chains

Xiao-min

Huang

et al. 2021

Int Trans Operational Res

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We study the innovation information sharing problem between two competing supply chains with one supplier and one manufacturer each. The manufacturer in each chain has private information about its product innovation degree and may choose to share such information with the competitor (horizontal information sharing), its supplier (vertical information sharing), or both (full transparency). We find that irrespective of the status of horizontal information sharing, vertical sharing always hurts the manufacturer, and sharing information horizontally is a dominating strategy for each manufacturer when the competition intensity is small. Furthermore, when competition intensity is not extremely large, full transparency can be realized through some transfer from the suppliers to the manufacturers, achieving a Pareto improvement for all parties, because the vertical and horizontal sharing are complementary to increase the supplier's benefit. Otherwise, neither horizontal nor vertical information sharing will occur.

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“…Lu et al [38] observed that the information received by manufacturers from retailers may be wrong and studied the value of information sharing in information error. Wang et al [39] characterized the information sharing problem of manufacturers and retailers in a supply chain using wholesale price contract strategy under the condition of continuous or interrupted market demand. e results showed that when the level of information reliability was lower, information sharing was more beneficial to manufacturers but did harm to retailers and the whole supply chain.…”

Section: Information Sharing In An Uncertain Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategies of Multichannel Apparel Supply Chain Based on Showrooming and Information Sharing

Wang

Luo

Chang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper examines the influence of information forecast accuracy on the profits of the supply chain under the circumstance of a multichannel apparel supply chain. Due to the emergence of multichannel, customer showrooming behavior is becoming increasingly prevalent. For example, consumers usually buy garments online after experiencing the service in the traditional bricks and mortar in the clothing industry. Meanwhile, there are often information barriers between the manufacturer and the retailer, which will affect enterprise decision-making. To solve these problems, this paper mainly investigates the information sharing and customer showrooming phenomenon, which includes four models: no information sharing without showrooming model (NN), information sharing without showrooming model (SN), no information sharing with showrooming model (NS), and information sharing with showrooming model (SS). The numerical analysis shows that under the impact of the forecast error, information sharing between channel members is more favorable than no information sharing when parameters satisfy certain conditions. From the perspectives of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole supply chain, customer showrooming behavior will bring them less profit. These conclusions mean that the retailer should share information with the manufacturer and adjust their service level and sales price to alleviate the effect of showrooming.

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Information sharing and the impact of shutdown policy in a supply chain with market disruption risk in the social media era

Cited by 28 publications

References 40 publications

Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

Innovation information sharing between two competitive supply chains

Pricing Strategies of Multichannel Apparel Supply Chain Based on Showrooming and Information Sharing

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