Information Sharing in Contests

Kovenock, Dan; Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes

doi:10.1111/jems.12105

Cited by 59 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(52 reference statements)

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“…Our paper is also related to the literature on players' incentive to acquire and share information in different auction formats, such as Persico (), Yildirim (), Compte and Jehiel (), Szech (), Morath and Münster (), Denter, Morgan, and D. Sisak (), and Kovenock, Morath, and Münster (). In particular, in contrast to this paper, Denter, Morgan, and Sisak () consider one‐sided asymmetric information in an all pay setting.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In spite of the difficulty in explicitly characterizing the bidding strategies, Serena successfully identifies the disclosure policy that generates the highest expected 13. Our paper is also related to the literature on players' incentive to acquire and share information in different auction formats, such as Persico (2000), Yildirim (2005), Compte and Jehiel (2007), Szech (2011), Morath and Münster (2013), Denter, Morgan, and D. Sisak (2014), and Kovenock, Morath, and Münster (2015). In particular, in contrast to this paper, Denter, Morgan, and Sisak (2014) consider one-sided asymmetric information in an all pay setting.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Ranking Disclosure Policies in All‐pay Auctions

Wang

2017

Economic Inquiry

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In this paper, we study information disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with incomplete information. Two symmetric players have either high or low private value. The contest organizer observes players' values ex post, and can commit ex ante to four different symmetric information policies exhaustively: She can fully disclose or conceal the players' types, and she can disclose their types if and only if when both are high or if and only if when both are low. We characterize the unique equilibriums, and completely rank the four policies by various criteria. We find the full concealment policy extracts highest aggregate expected effort, followed by the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are high. The policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are low induces least aggregate expected effort. Players enjoy highest expected payoffs under the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are low; the other three policies yield the same expected payoffs to players. In terms of prize allocation efficiency, the full concealment policy is ranked highest and the full disclosure policy is ranked lowest. In between, the other two policies' rankings depend on the probability of high type. (JEL C72, D44, D82, D83, J48).

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Ranking Disclosure Policies in All‐pay Auctions

Wang

2017

Economic Inquiry

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“…Cf. Denter et al (2014) and Kovenock et al (2015). For an introduction to the burgeoning literature on all-pay contests, see Konrad (2009). nent that the battle will be excessively unequal, thereby inducing the stronger player to choose a more moderate strategy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 Speci…cally, Kovenock et al (2015) showed that, regardless of whether valuations are private or common, the interim information sharing game followed by an all-pay auction admits a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which no player ever shares her private information. The present analysis is complementary to that of Kovenock et al (2015) in the sense that, instead of the all-pay auction, we consider a probabilistic contest. Overall, the review of the literature suggests that the speci…c research question pursued in the present paper, viz.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voluntary Disclosure in Unfair Contests

Ewerhart¹,

Grrnseis²

2018

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of ver-i…able information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other player (the underdog). A condition is identi…ed that ensures that a given contest is unfair regardless of disclosure decisions. Under this condition, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog-so that the contest unravels. We also show that self-disclosure may, with positive probability, provoke unintended reactions, i.e., "dominant"or "de…ant"behavior. Moreover, while individually rational for the marginal type, the unraveling may be strictly Pareto inferior from an ex-ante perspective. Our main conclusion is just the opposite of the corresponding …nding for the deterministic all-pay auction. The proofs employ lattice-theoretic methods and an improved version of Jensen's inequality.

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“…() in the context of lobbying, by Kovenock et al . () in all‐pay auctions, and by Gill () and Gordon () in R&D races. Mediated communication is studied by Hörner et al .…”

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Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour

Gordon

Riboni

2015

Econ J

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International audienceWe consider a conflict under incomplete information where two opponents fight to impose their preferred policy. Before the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. Under some conditions, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent: the agent never doubts the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent, and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under other conditions, the agent believes that his opponent may be right, even when all evidence indicates that the policy preferred by the opponent is certainly suboptimal. In this case, the agent adopts dovish attitudes and conflicts are less violent

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Information Sharing in Contests

Cited by 59 publications

References 52 publications

Ranking Disclosure Policies in All‐pay Auctions

Ranking Disclosure Policies in All‐pay Auctions

Voluntary Disclosure in Unfair Contests

Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour

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