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Purpose This study aims to describe the general picture of the competition in multichannel expert services in duopoly market and discuss how the quality difference may affects the competition between service providers with different quality levels, where both providers offer face-to-face channel and one of providers offers online channel additionally and service quality that consumers have heterogeneous preferences for is vertically differentiated. These results can be used to determine which service providers should offer online expert services and understand the competition in multichannel expert services in duopoly. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the stylized vertical differentiation model to investigate the role of quality in expert services market, assuming that two services providers offer the same services with different quality levels and one of them having additional online services. Taking into account the differences of services from products and the particularity of online service, this paper extends the vertical differentiation model to expert services market. Findings The quality difference is the key factor in the competition of expert services. Service prices and the profits of providers, independent of the quality levels, are positively related to the quality difference, whereas the demand of online services is in the opposite direction regardless of which provider offers online channel. It demonstrates that provider with low-quality level should open online channel from the point of view of social welfare if it is closely related to the expert services, even though any provider can make more profits by opening online channel. Research limitations/implications This extended vertical differentiation model, taking into account the importance of vertical differentiation in expert service, ignores the horizontal differentiation. More accurate strategies for multichannel expert services providers with what level of the quality a provider should offer is needed in future work. Moreover, this paper does not consider the different waiting costs of consumers in face-to-face channel and assumes that their problem will be solved eventually. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has focused on the quality difference in multichannel expert services market or discussed how to offer online expert services in the duopoly market. This study extends the vertical differentiation model to the multichannel expert service market. Therefore, it fills this research gap and extends research to expert services market in the new network environment, aiming to help understand the competition in multichannel expert services.
Purpose This study aims to describe the general picture of the competition in multichannel expert services in duopoly market and discuss how the quality difference may affects the competition between service providers with different quality levels, where both providers offer face-to-face channel and one of providers offers online channel additionally and service quality that consumers have heterogeneous preferences for is vertically differentiated. These results can be used to determine which service providers should offer online expert services and understand the competition in multichannel expert services in duopoly. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the stylized vertical differentiation model to investigate the role of quality in expert services market, assuming that two services providers offer the same services with different quality levels and one of them having additional online services. Taking into account the differences of services from products and the particularity of online service, this paper extends the vertical differentiation model to expert services market. Findings The quality difference is the key factor in the competition of expert services. Service prices and the profits of providers, independent of the quality levels, are positively related to the quality difference, whereas the demand of online services is in the opposite direction regardless of which provider offers online channel. It demonstrates that provider with low-quality level should open online channel from the point of view of social welfare if it is closely related to the expert services, even though any provider can make more profits by opening online channel. Research limitations/implications This extended vertical differentiation model, taking into account the importance of vertical differentiation in expert service, ignores the horizontal differentiation. More accurate strategies for multichannel expert services providers with what level of the quality a provider should offer is needed in future work. Moreover, this paper does not consider the different waiting costs of consumers in face-to-face channel and assumes that their problem will be solved eventually. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has focused on the quality difference in multichannel expert services market or discussed how to offer online expert services in the duopoly market. This study extends the vertical differentiation model to the multichannel expert service market. Therefore, it fills this research gap and extends research to expert services market in the new network environment, aiming to help understand the competition in multichannel expert services.
Food credence attributes (e.g., food safety, organic, and carbon neutral production methods) are quality characteristics of products that cannot be assessed by buyers at the point of sale without additional information (e.g., certification labels). Hence, the ability to access credence attributes of a particular product can result in a situation termed as asymmetric distributed information among supply chain stakeholders (e.g., producers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, consumer) where one party of a market transaction is in possession of more information about a product than the other party. This situation can lead to potential inefficiencies, e.g., misinformation, risk of food borne illness, or opportunistic behavior such as fraud. The present study sought to develop a conceptual framework that describes a) the motivation for key stakeholders to participate in the market for food credence attributes, b) the type of food credence attributes that key stakeholders provide, and c) current mechanisms to address the issue of information asymmetry among the stakeholders in the food system. The study was conducted using an integrative literature review. The developed framework consists of two components: a) the food supply chain and b) the attribute assurance system among which multiple links exist. The findings suggest that retailers, processors, NGOs, and government authorities are influential stakeholders within the supply chain of food credence attributes by imposing food quality standards which can address information asymmetry among food actors. While the credence attribute assurance system (e.g., food standards, third party food attribute assurance providers) can potentially address the issue of asymmetric information among market stakeholders, a range of issues remain. These include food standards as a potential market entry barrier for food producers and distributors, limited food standard harmonization, and communication challenges of food attribute assurance (e.g., consumers’ signal processing, signal use and trust). The syntheses presented in this study contributes to stakeholders’ (e.g., supply chain actors, scientists, policy makers) improved understanding about the components of the credence food system and their integration as well as the drivers for change in this system.
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