2003
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhg017
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Information Technology and Financial Services Competition: Table 1

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Cited by 267 publications
(116 citation statements)
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References 22 publications
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“…In this literature it is well established that close ties between a bank and a borrowing firm influence the firm's access to finance in several possible ways (see Boot (2000) for a summary). Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Hauswald and Marquez (2003), for instance, argued that repeated lending facilitates monitoring and screening and thereby mitigates problems of asymmetric information about a borrow's creditworthiness, because subsequent monitoring of the same borrower is more efficient as it involves lower monitoring costs and/or improves the signal about the borrower's creditworthiness. As these models point out, it strongly depends on the credit market conditions to what extend the informational advantage of a relationship lender mitigates the borrowing firms' funding constraints.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this literature it is well established that close ties between a bank and a borrowing firm influence the firm's access to finance in several possible ways (see Boot (2000) for a summary). Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Hauswald and Marquez (2003), for instance, argued that repeated lending facilitates monitoring and screening and thereby mitigates problems of asymmetric information about a borrow's creditworthiness, because subsequent monitoring of the same borrower is more efficient as it involves lower monitoring costs and/or improves the signal about the borrower's creditworthiness. As these models point out, it strongly depends on the credit market conditions to what extend the informational advantage of a relationship lender mitigates the borrowing firms' funding constraints.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hauswald and Marquez, 2003;or von Thadden, 2004), which could lead to a decreased interest rate sensitivity to firm's risk characteristics. This informational gain is only present for overlap borrowers and not for firms borrowing from only one of the merging banks.…”
Section: Ii2 Borrower Heterogeneity: Modifications Of the Trade-off mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…La ganancia de eficiencia implicaría la reducción del riesgo en sus actividades, permitiendo una mejora en la calidad de cartera crediticia. En efecto, Hauswald y Márquez (2003) afirman que un contexto de mayor competencia, impulsa a los intermediarios financieros al desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías financieras de evaluación y control del riesgo crediticio lo que mejora la calidad de sus carteras crediticias. Asimismo, Caminal y Matutes (2002), Boyd y De Nicoló (2005) señalan que los bancos con mayor poder de mercado tienden a incurrir en un mayor riesgo crediticio al fijar elevadas tasas de interés a sus clientes, elevando con ello la probabilidad de no repago de los créditos.…”
Section: Marco Teóricounclassified