Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models

Mesterton‐Gibbons, Mike; Sherratt, Tom N.

doi:10.1007/s13235-011-0017-4

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Variability is omnipresent in nature. Individuals vary in their abilities [27] and environmental conditions fluctuate in time and space [15,6,42,11].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Moran process and Wright-Fisher process favor low variability

Rychtář¹,

Taylor²

2021

DCDS-B

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We study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. We assume the individuals are one of two competing genotypes, A or B. The genotypes have the same average fitness but different variances and/or third central moments. We focus on two frequency-independent stochastic processes: (1) Wright-Fisher process and (2) Moran process. Both processes have two absorbing states corresponding to homogeneous populations of all A or all B. Despite the fact that types A and B have the same average fitness, both stochastic dynamics differ from a random drift. In both processes, the selection favors A replacing B and opposes B replacing A if the fitness variance for A is smaller than the fitness variance for B. In the case the variances are equal, the selection favors A replacing B and opposes B replacing A if the third central moment of A is larger than the third central moment of B. We show that these results extend to structured populations and other dynamics where the selection acts at birth. We also demonstrate that the selection favors a larger variance in fitness if the selection acts at death.

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“…Variability is omnipresent in nature. Individuals vary in their abilities [27] and environmental conditions fluctuate in time and space [15,6,42,11].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Moran process and Wright-Fisher process favor low variability

Rychtář¹,

Taylor²

2021

DCDS-B

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“…To understand the role of RHP in the decision to physically share or randomly allocate contested resources, we now consider a special case of the Hawk-Dove game with continuous variation in RHP (Crowley 2000;McNamara and Houston 2005;Mesterton-Gibbons and Sherratt 2011) in which two individuals contest a resource (such as a food ball) of value 1. A strategy in this game is an RHP threshold, below which an individual agrees to share, above which the individual fights to obtain sole possession of the resource.…”

Section: Resource Sharing and Similarity Of Rhpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divide and conquer: when and how should competitors share?

Mesterton‐Gibbons¹,

Sherratt

2012

Evol Ecol

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When two individuals are unwilling to fight over a valuable resource, then they may obtain it with equal probability, or they may choose to divide the resource in some way. Although both strategies have been observed in nature, modelers have so far implicitly assumed that their long-term payoffs are the same. First we show that increasing returns to size in the value of a resource favor random allocation over sharing, whereas diminishing returns favor the reverse. Next we extend our approach to understand the conditions under which sharing will evolve when contestants vary in their resource-holding potential. We show that although closely matched individuals are more likely to share, it is by no means a prerequisite when contestants have limited information about one another's abilities. Collectively, our models support recent observations of physical sharing as a solution to conflict resolution, and elucidate the conditions under which sharing will arise.

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