2002
DOI: 10.1628/0932456022975475
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Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives

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Cited by 12 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Here the global decision maker's costsC(π, u) are defined in (17), (18), T π is the public belief Bayesian update (11), and the measure σ(π, a) is defined in (11).…”
Section: A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Here the global decision maker's costsC(π, u) are defined in (17), (18), T π is the public belief Bayesian update (11), and the measure σ(π, a) is defined in (11).…”
Section: A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recall T (π, y) is the Hidden Markov Model Bayesian filter defined in (7). Thus the only difference between the classical and social learning quickest detection problems is the update of the belief state, namely (7) in the classical setup versus (11) in the social learning formulation.…”
Section: ) Notationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…8 Complementarities in the decision to produce information also arise due to other reasons in several other papers. For example see, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992); Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994); Bru and Vives (2002);andVeldkamp (2006a and2006b). 9 Our paper can be linked to contexts that are even beyond financial markets.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…. , N , at which price the demand from k informed traders is met by suppliers: follows Bru and Vives [8]. Without the information aggregation by the auctioneer, the model becomes similar to that of Minehart and Scotchmer [30], who showed that the traders cannot agree to disagree in a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium may not exist, or if it exists, it is a herding equilibrium where all the traders choose the same action.…”
Section: Model and Equilibriummentioning
confidence: 96%
“…In contrast, this paper shows that stochastic herding with a power law distribution emerges in the symmetric structure of information inference among traders. The model can be extended to incorporate the heterogeneous information structure that modifies the threshold (8). The analytical method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations by the fictitious tatonnement remains valid, and the resulting distribution will be affected by the heterogeneity in the traders' reference groups.…”
Section: Information Structurementioning
confidence: 99%