Informational intra‐group influence: the effects of time pressure and group size

Bonner, Bryan L.; Baumann, Michael R.

doi:10.1002/ejsp.400

Cited by 29 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…In our opinion, the most likely explanation for the strong reduction of group members' metric error and the rapid increase in estimation accuracy is the exchange of reference values during the first group interaction. As we know from previous research, frames of reference play an important role when it comes to increases in estimation accuracy (e.g., Bonner & Baumann, 2008;Bonner et al, 2007;Laughlin et al, 1999;Laughlin et al, 2003). Such reference values are relatively easy to communicate and to retain, and they should have a beneficial effect on all subsequent judgments in the same domain.…”

Section: Group-to-individual Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous studies imply that providing people with frames of reference can strongly increase their estimation accuracy (e.g., Bonner & Baumann, 2008;Bonner et al, 2007;Laughlin et al, 1999;Laughlin et al, 2003). Collaborating with others during quantitative estimations could have exactly this effect: During their task-related communication, group members provide the reasoning for their individual estimates and illustrate the validity of certain benchmarks (Schultze et al, 2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

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How Much Group is Necessary? Group-To-Individual Transfer in Estimation Tasks

Stern¹,

Schultze²,

Schulz‐Hardt³

2017

Collabra: Psychology

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Hardt G-I transfer denotes an increase in individual performance due to group interaction, for example, because of acquiring certain skills or knowledge from the other group members. Whereas such G-I transfer has been successfully shown for problem-solving tasks, evidence for G-I transfer on quantitative estimation tasks is scarce. We address this research gap with a focus on how often a group has to interact in order to fully exploit the benefit of this learning effect. Results from two experiments support the idea that a single group interaction is sufficient to induce a stable G-I transfer, which reduces group members' metric error. Smaller metric errors indicate that people improved their representation of the correct upper and lower boundaries, or what range of values is plausible. In contrast to nominal groups, both members of continuously interacting groups and members of groups with only one initial interaction exhibited stable G-I transfer, and the size of this transfer did not significantly differ between the latter two conditions. Furthermore, we found evidence for differential weighting of group members' individual contributions that goes beyond sheer individual capability gains under certain circumstances, namely in tasks with a population bias.

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Section: Group-to-individual Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

How Much Group is Necessary? Group-To-Individual Transfer in Estimation Tasks

Stern¹,

Schultze²,

Schulz‐Hardt³

2017

Collabra: Psychology

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“…In contrast, intellective tasks include eureka‐type tasks. Groups tend to exhibit better performance than individuals in intellective tasks (Laughlin, Bonner & Miner, ; Bonner & Baumann, ).…”

Section: Disposition Effect and Decision Making In Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk Aversion, the Disposition Effect, and Group Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis

2017

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This article reports a laboratory experiment comparing the behavior of individuals and groups in terms of their susceptibility to the disposition effect. A total of 174 students took part in six experimental sessions in which they made decisions individually, in pairs, or in three-person groups. It was observed that the disposition effect was attenuated when the decisions were made in groups of two or three members. It was also noted that the attenuating effect of group decision making was the result of a reduction in the proportion of gains realized, indicating that the groups were less risk averse than individuals.Simple linear regression and then multivariate linear regression with dummy variables were conducted in order to test whether these differences were statistically significant. These regressions are described by Equations (4) and (5), respectively, and their results are shown in Tables 4 and 5.

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“…The successful resolution of trade talks usually hinges on the efforts of a few negotiators-often the Director General of the WTO himself-to craft a final negotiating text from many different competing 80. See, for example, Forsyth 2010;andBonner andBaumann 2008. 81.…”

Section: Preferences To Political Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation

Hafner-Burton¹,

LeVeck²,

Victor³

et al. 2014

Int Org

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Why do some decision makers prefer big multilateral agreements while others prefer cooperation in small clubs? Does enforcement encourage or deter institutional cooperation? We use experiments drawn from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology-along with a substantive survey focused on international tradeto illustrate how two behavioral traits (patience and strategic reasoning) of individuals who play key roles in negotiating and ratifying an international treaty shape their preferences for how treaties are designed and whether they are ratified. Patient subjects were more likely to prefer treaties with larger numbers of countries (and larger long-term benefits), as were subjects with the skill to anticipate how others will respond over multiple iterations of strategic games. The presence of an enforcement mechanism increased subjects' willingness to ratify treaties; however, strategic reasoning had double the effect of adding enforcement to a trade agreement: more strategic subjects were particularly likely to favor ratifying the agreement. We report these results for a sample of 509 university students and also show how similar patterns are revealed in a unique sample of ninety-two actual US policy elites. Under some conditions certain types of university student convenience samples can be useful for revealing elite-dominated policy preferences-different types of people in the same situation may prefer to approach decisionmaking tasks and reason through trade-offs in materially different ways.What determines preferences for international legal cooperation? What determines how decision makers prefer to design or whether they aspire to ratify international

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Informational intra‐group influence: the effects of time pressure and group size

Cited by 29 publications

References 46 publications

How Much Group is Necessary? Group-To-Individual Transfer in Estimation Tasks

How Much Group is Necessary? Group-To-Individual Transfer in Estimation Tasks

Risk Aversion, the Disposition Effect, and Group Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis

Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation

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