Infrastructure Interdependency Failures From Extreme Weather Events as a Complex Process

Abstract

The loss of infrastructure services under extreme weather events from climate change emerges from complex interactions between the social, environmental, and technological system variables which drive the behavior of infrastructure systems. The complexity of interactions causes failures to cascade in unpredictable ways, often between different infrastructure systems. A common approach to managing this unpredictability is to attempt to characterize the cause-and-effect relationships of infrastructure interdependencies, whether it be related to the resource flows, geographic proximity, logical connections, or the common use of cyber infrastructure. We posit that though a reductive approach toward characterization of interdependencies produces useful insights, it is an insufficient strategy by itself due to the complexity and unpredictability involved in the occurrence and magnitude of cascades of failure across systems. We present historical case studies which demonstrate that cascades from interdependencies display essential tenets of complexity-namely non-linearities, path dependence, and emergence. The Cynefin decision-making framework suggests that management of systems that are in the complex domain include strategies such as Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Safe-to-Fail, which address uncertainty by probing, testing, collecting and analyzing data, and lastly deploying solutions with a commitment to reassessing the systems as conditions change. We therefore recommend that in order to mitigate the surprise from cascades of failure across systems from extreme weather events, infrastructure managers supplement their planning efforts with these types of strategies.

Building resilience to extreme weather and climate events in the rural water and wastewater sectors

“…Second, disruptions to the water infrastructure affect multiple sectors, including the economy, energy and water security, and public health (Bell et al, 2016; Lall et al, 2018). Third, there are infrastructure interdependencies among water and wastewater systems and electrical and transportation infrastructure that can amplify vulnerabilities (Bondank & Chester, 2020; Chang et al, 2007). Fourth, there are regional differences in water management‐related vulnerabilities, concerns, and priorities, which emerge from differences in climate and non‐climate stressors (Dilling et al, 2015).…”

“…and electrical and transportation infrastructure that can amplify vulnerabilities (Bondank & Chester, 2020;Chang et al, 2007). Fourth, there are regional differences in water management-related vulnerabilities, concerns, and priorities, which emerge from differences in climate and non-climate stressors (Dilling et al, 2015).…”

Exploring the Impact of Winter Storm Uri on Power Outage, Air Quality, and Water Systems in Texas, USA

“…For example, the power outage rate in Harris county dropped from 7,801,887 outage hours to 1,419,054 outage hours and even less than 38,400 outage hours on 19 February 2021. customers without electricity, some of whom for several days. The freeze had cascading effects on other services reliant upon electricity, e.g., drinking water treatment and medical services [12,20,21,35]. The resilience of the entire power system depends on the severity and duration of extreme weather events [3,25,36,37].…”

“…The cascading failure of these interdependent systems (natural gas delivery, power plant generation, etc.) resulted in disruptions and failures in the public water system, power outages, and the release of millions of pounds of pollutants and greenhouse gases into the atmosphere [12]. Climate change exposure to extreme events associated with natural…”