Injecting disinformation into public space: pseudo-media and reality-altering narratives

Abstract

This paper analyses the context of disinformation in Spain from the perspective of the pseudo-media (i.e., websites that mimic conventional media to offer partisan content based on alternative facts). Using a quantitative (N = 1,143) and qualitative (n = 396) methodology, this research analyses publications from eight Spanish pseudo-media that reach more than 4 million unique users. Results reveal an interest in three topics: vaccination, restrictions and speculation about Covid-19, national politics –focused on criticism against government– and topics related to human rights –mainly LGBTI, gender, immigration– with a total of 58.1% of the content published in four sections (International, Spain, Society, and Economy). The study reveals a growing trend towards polarisation and the use of clickbait techniques in four out of ten headlines. The Internet and social media are the most common sources quoted, while a third of the items lack sources or correspond to opinion pieces. Minorities and vulnerable groups are framed as a social threat, and the presentation of the coalition government as a danger to Spain that must be put to an end, which makes the discourse of these websites in tune with the ideology of the far right wing.

Digital journalism in Spain: Technological, sociopolitical and economic factors as drivers of media evolution

“…For example, the ideological polarization unleashed in the country since 2014, after the 15 m Movement, and the bid for independence in Catalonia led to the emergence of highly politicized digital native media aligned with emerging political organizations and ideological proposals. They also paved the way for the emergence of certain “pseudo-media” sites (Palau-Sampio and Carratalá, 2022) characterized by deliberately publishing false content.…”

Innovation, digitization, and disinformation management in European regional television stations in the Circom network

“…The rise and impact of disinformation through social networks are already inescapably part of the fourth wave of digital democracy (Ireton;Posetti, 2018), whose the most notable milestones in shaping public opinion are the intensive use of artificial intelligence and Big Data, the search for engagement with audiences, and the validation of lies as a political strategy, with a combination of hyperlocal and supranational elements (García-Orosa, 2021). Consequently, disinformation causes an alteration and manipulation of public space and democratic dialog, including pseudo-media and web content that mimic the format of traditional media through narratives that alter reality, which though they have been present since the beginning of public life, have never before had the resources to achieve large-scale repercussions (Palau-Sampio;Carratalá, 2022).…”

Mentiras, prejuicios y rechazo. El uso de la desinformación para propagar discursos de odio contra personas migrantes y refugiadas en redes sociales: un estudio articulado del caso español

“…Las condiciones en las que desarrollan su trabajo no son ideales, y gran parte de las decisiones que deben tomar vienen impuestas por la industria: escasa atención y tratamiento superficial en la cobertura sobre migración, precariedad, insuficiente formación, necesidad de adaptarse a prácticas multimedia, lucha por el clic, etc. Además, como se vio con claridad en el análisis de contenido de desmentidos, el problema no solo reside en los medios de comunicación y periodistas, sino en los pseudomedios y pseudoperiodistas, frecuentes difusores de narrativas desinformadoras y de odio (Palau-Sampio y Carratalá, 2022). Sus agendas no priorizan informar a la sociedad, pero tienen estéticas y estilos que los asemejan a los medios tradicionales, con los que se confunden, diseminando sus mensajes nocivos.…”

“…The conditions in which they carry out their work are not ideal, and a large part of the decisions they must make are imposed by the industry: scarce attention and superficial treatment in the coverage of migration, precariousness, insufficient training, the need to adapt to multimedia practices, the fight for the click, etc. In addition, as can clearly be seen in the content analysis of the verifications, the responsibility lies not only with the media and professional journalists, but also with the pseudo-media and pseudo-journalists, frequent disseminators of misinformation and hate narratives (Palau-Sampio & Carratalá, 2022).…”

“…Y el estudio de las cuentas problemáticas, porque Wardle y Derakhshan (2017) ya destacaban la importancia de controlar a las fuentes más que a los contenidos, algo que también reclamaRibeiro (2019), precisando que puede ser útil caracterizar y detectar "hateful users" más que "hateful content". Esta propuesta es precisamente la que han adoptado algunas investigaciones que han puesto el foco sobre potenciales y habituales productores de desinformación(Allcott et al, 2019;Hernández Conde y Fernández García, 2019;Palau-Sampio y Carratalá, 2022;Zimdars, 2016) o de odio…”