There has been a long-standing tendency in both the philosophical and nonphilosophical literature in the English-speaking world to view trust and trustworthiness primarily as three-place relations. Trust is: A trusts B to do X, and trustworthiness is: B doing X for A. This three-place schematic reflects English language use regarding the word "trust" as well as the widely-held beliefs that: 1) cooperation and knowledge acquisition are normally underpinned by trust and trustworthiness, 2) trust is a ubiquitous cognitive expectation classifiable as a distinct kind of reliance, and 3) trustworthiness is the ubiquitous fulfilment of that expectation classifiable as a distinct kind of reliability (often moralised-reliability). In this dissertation, it is argued that trust and trustworthiness are not three-place relations, and that thinking of them in this manner distorts the role they play in our lives. Instead, this dissertation proposes that trust and trustworthiness are each one-half of a two-place relation, and emphasises the special, private, complex, and interactive nature of this relation, rather than the behaviours (cooperation/reliance etc.) and expectations (belief/obligation etc.) often associated with it. The classification of trust and trustworthiness as being non-cognitive and non-moralised is essential, since a definitive feature of trust and trustworthiness is their remarkable capacity for non-conformity when it comes to the rules governing areas of our lives such as: social-communication, normative-behaviour, moral reasoning and moral action, truth, knowledge, rationality and agency. Acknowledging this anomalous rule-breaking facet of our humanity, which is similar to love, facilitates a better understanding of human behaviour and it allows us to divorce important questions about trust and trustworthiness from other distinct questions in epistemology and ethics. For David, for showing me trust and making me worthy. iv Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Michaelis Michael, for providing sound advice and considered guidance throughout my candidature. I would also like to thank the supportive staff in the Philosophy department at UNSW Sydney. In particular, my co-supervisor Melissa Merritt for introducing me to Iris Murdoch, and Markos Valaris for his role in sparking my initial interest in philosophy. I am grateful for the instruction provided by Professor Tony Attwood from Griffith University Queensland, who generously took the time to share his expertise in Theory of Mind with me. Both . Along with countless others, these individuals gently but determinedly give their time to share knowledge and resources with anyone willing to listen and learn. On a personal note, the irreplaceable individuals who supported all the other aspects of my life as I undertook this dissertation -my parents Lainie and Tony, my children Margaret and Hume, my dear friend Hamish, and my David -provided me with the love and trust, and so the expertise, that it really took to write this dissertati...