2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2011.02083.x
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Innovation, Competition and Antitrust: An Examination of the Intel Case

Abstract: Microprocessor-maker Intel has been subjected to the highest fine in the history of EU competition policy. Intel operates in a market with one other main supplier, a fact that seemed to provide grounds to those accusing it of abusing a dominant position. The authors argue that, in spite of the limited number of players, the microprocessor market showed the distinctive marks of dynamic competition: ever-lower prices and ever-growing innovation. Political considerations more than sound economic reasoning seem to… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…5 of 1999 prohibits predatory pricing practice because it can lead to monopolistic practice. It is even further strengthened by the large amount of literature that agrees with the law that punishing predatory prices is the worst illegal open exploitation because the strategy is using the economic justification for getting an attempt to monopolize (Kennedy, 2020;Taylor et al, 2013) after the market is 'cleared' (Mazzone & Mingardi, 2011). For jurists or legal scholars and some other economists who argue that predatory pricing is rational, they also note that predatory pricing will only make sense if predatory firms compensate for their initial losses after gaining monopoly power.…”
Section: Second Forcing Competitors Out and Barriers To Entrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 of 1999 prohibits predatory pricing practice because it can lead to monopolistic practice. It is even further strengthened by the large amount of literature that agrees with the law that punishing predatory prices is the worst illegal open exploitation because the strategy is using the economic justification for getting an attempt to monopolize (Kennedy, 2020;Taylor et al, 2013) after the market is 'cleared' (Mazzone & Mingardi, 2011). For jurists or legal scholars and some other economists who argue that predatory pricing is rational, they also note that predatory pricing will only make sense if predatory firms compensate for their initial losses after gaining monopoly power.…”
Section: Second Forcing Competitors Out and Barriers To Entrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is drafted to protect the smaller firms from the power of the larger enterprises (Calvani, 1981;Lapachi & Ketevan, 2002). In Intel case law, it was found that political considerations played more important role than economic reasoning behind the EU antitrust decision (Mazzone & Mingardi, 2011). Tackling of monopolistic pricing is also a main concern (Wu, 2012).…”
Section: An Overview On the Roles Of Competition Law In Eu And The Usmentioning
confidence: 99%